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Abstract
For a long time, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) was characterized by the focus on trade issues. In recent years however, 
other policy aspects have emerged, amongst which migration. This evolution results from the gradual 
recognition of the importance of migration in the Union’s external relations. The mainstreaming of 
migration in the relations with third countries raised the need for a Global Approach to Migration (2005) 
connecting illegal and legal migration, as well as introducing a positive migration-development nexus. 
The acknowledgement of a possible positive contribution of legal migration – if well managed – for 
developing countries, has resulted into new concrete initiatives such as circular migration, mobility part-
nerships and the Blue Card Directive. A closer look at the policy frameworks, as well as specific measures 
demonstrate however, that a true comprehensive approach is a long way from home. It is examined if the 
specific EU-ACP relationship offers a different point of view and effectively makes migration work for the 
development of both parties. More specifically, do the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) corre-
spond to the abovementioned goal? A comprehensive and coherent legal framework that unites the inter-
ests of the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and those of the developing countries, on the 
other hand, seems a distant perspective. It is concluded that ambitious policy objectives have been set and 
are waiting to be addressed by corresponding policy frameworks and legal commitments.
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1. Introduction: Uniting Conflicting Interests and Defining Concepts
In recent years, migration has slowly developed as a headline on the international 
agenda and has been recognized as one of the strategic priorities of the Union and 
its Member States. Initially, this was approached as an internal issue, but it soon 
became clear that migration had to be integrated in the Union’s external policy. 
The external dimension of migration was however essentially guided by security 
concerns1 and a “zero” immigration policy.2 In a globalizing and changing world 
1) Security concerns are interpreted sensu lato, that is encompassing not only clear external threats such as 
terrorism, but also illegal migration issues, human trafficking, readmission etc.
2) Communication on “A Community Immigration Policy”, 22.11.2000, COM(2000)757.
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this turned out to be unsustainable. The idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ and restrained 
migration had shown its limits. Gradually, the idea that well managed migration 
could serve both the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and the 
developing countries, on the other hand, became prevalent. The former are more 
and more in search of highly skilled professionals as an answer to the demo-
graphic changes and in the attainment of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy and Europe 
2020. The latter searching for a better and quicker attainment of the set develop-
ment goals through optimizing legal channels for lower and unskilled migrants 
and limiting the negative effects of brain drain. The challenge was therefore to 
find a coherent, comprehensive and balanced policy and legal answers uniting 
both interests.
The category of legal migrants can be divided into two subcategories, more 
specifically economic migrants and asylum seekers and refugees. The first differs 
from the latter in the sense that economic migrants are not covered under inter-
national rules of protection for admission. There is no obligation under interna-
tional law for states to let economic migrants enter their territory. In theory, an 
additional division could be made between voluntary and forced migration, but 
in practice there is a fine line between these categories.3 Economic migration is 
just as well inclined to be motivated by compelling push factors. Legal economic 
migration can benefit development in many ways, such as by tackling the root 
causes of migration as a long term development goal and through remittances. In 
the following analysis migration is addressed form the angle of the possible posi-
tive and negative effects of legal economic migration, hence from the stance of 
skills transfers or losses. The search for a common comprehensive approach from 
a human resource point of view is thus the underlying point of departure.
2. A Legal Basis and a Policy Framework for Economic Migration to the 
Benefit of All?
The Union’s competence in migration is the reflection of the lack of political will 
and the reluctance of the Member States in conferring powers regarding legal 
economic migration to the Union and thus being clear constraints in the Union’s 
capacity to formulate a common migration policy. The same trend can be identi-
fied in the numerous policy documents that shape the marked evolution in migra-
tion policy. The securitized vision on the external dimension of immigration 
progressed into a comprehensive approach encompassing illegal migration,4 legal 
3) S.E. Findley, “Compelled to Move: the Rise of Forced Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in M.A.B. 
Siddique (ed.), International migration into the 21st century: essays in honour of Reginald Appleyard, Chel-
tenham: Elgar 2001, pp. 275–305.
4) Some prefer the term irregular immigration, since “illegal” migration has the negative connotation of 
criminal behaviour. E.g., Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on “A global approach to migration: 
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migration and a migration-development nexus. The latter being at first limited 
mainly to the root causes of migration, thus the negative migration-development 
migration nexus. Slowly, the possible benefits of legal migration for development, 
corresponding to a positive migration-development nexus, gained ground. 
Together with this evolution, the need for more coherence between the different 
policies emerged, as did the call for an actual comprehensive approach and imple-
mentation of made political commitments.
2.1. Constraints on the Union’s Competence
The Maastricht Treaty provisions on migration were to be found under the for-
mer intergovernmental pillar of Title VI concerning cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs (Article K.1, paragraph 3 TEU). The Treaty of Amster-
dam, integrating the Schengen acquis, transferred the powers on visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons to the Com-
munity pillar (Title IV TEC). The provision on legal economic migration was to 
be found in ex Article 63, paragraph 3(a) TEC. This Article was kept in the Nice 
Treaty. Several provisions in the former TEC demonstrate the reluctance of Mem-
ber States in transferring powers concerning economic immigration for third 
country nationals to the Community. The provisions of ex Article 63, paragraph 
3 and 4 TEC were excluded from the obligation to take measures within a period 
of five years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. Moreover, the 
provided possibility (Article 67 TEC), for the Council, after this five year transi-
tional period to decide5 to submit the adoption of measures under these provi-
sions to the procedure of Article ex 251 TEC, which means qualified majority 
voting (QMV) and co-decision, was never taken for measures concerning legal 
migration.6 Unanimity and consultation of the European Parliament (EP) 
remained the rule for the adoption of such measures. Regardless of the fact that 
no explicit provision on the Member States’ competence regarding the volumes of 
admission of third country nationals coming from third countries in order to seek 
work, be it employed or self-employed, was present, the Union always recognized 
the limits of its competence in the area of legal economic migration.7 The current 
Lisbon Treaty is a copy of the failed Constitutional Treaty (resp. Article III-257 
developing a European policy on labour immigration in conjunction with relations with third countries”, 
OJ C 257/20 of 9 October 2008, point 14.
5) 2004/927/EC: Council decision of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV 
of Part Three of the Treaty Establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid 
down in Article 251 of the Treaty, OJ L 396/45 of 31 December 2004.
6) S. Peers, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Issue 9 (2007), pp. (229) 231 (251); S. Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration 
and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law, Issue 10 (2008), pp. (219) 220 (247).
7) This appears for example from the Hague Programme (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European 
Council, 4 and 5 November 2004, p. 19).
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and Article III-267). The objective to develop a common immigration policy was 
consolidated in Article 67, paragraph 2 TFEU and the specific aims of the immi-
gration policy were inserted (Article 79 TFEU). Measures in the area of economic 
migration are now taken under the ordinary legislative procedure, co-decision 
and QMV (Article 79, paragraph 2(a) TFEU). The paragraph in ex Article 63 
TEC allowing Member States to maintain or introduce in the areas (3 and 4) 
national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with international 
agreements, was removed. The specific provisions were completed with the explicit 
reference in Article 4 (j) TFEU that, for the external dimension, competence is 
shared in the area of freedom, security and justice. This seems to imply a concur-
rent shared competence, in the sense that Member States can exercise their com-
petence as long as and to the extent the Union has not. The current treaty does 
not explicitly attribute more power to the Union, but it does clarify that there is 
a Union competence concerning economic migration, however with clear restric-
tions.8 Integration measures (Article 79, paragraph 4 TFEU) – possibly combined 
with incentives and support measures of the Union – and the competence to fix 
the number of immigrants coming from a third country in search for work (Arti-
cle 79, paragraph 5 TFEU) remain Member State competences. The inclusion of 
the goal to develop a common immigration policy and specific objectives in Arti-
cle 79, paragraph 1 TFEU might provide grounds for more intensive EU action, 
however taking into account the stated limitations.9
This evolution shows that economic migration remains a key element of the 
Member States’ sovereignty. Nonetheless, the changed context demanded for a 
different and therefore a common European approach to migration, hence the 
abovementioned changes. The most important changes after the Amsterdam 
Treaty were the consolidation of the objective to create a common immigration 
policy and the shift in the decision-making procedure. Despite this step forward, 
it is clear that Member States have been and still are reluctant to transfer all of 
their powers regarding legal economic immigration. This often constitutes prob-
lems, but is not necessarily a plea to confer all remaining competence to the 
Union. First and foremost it is a question of coordination and coherence between 
the Member States and in relation to other policy areas.
A further distinction must indeed be made between EU’s powers on legal eco-
nomic migration and art. 207 TFEU, the common commercial policy (CCP), 
being exclusive, uniform and with no opt-outs. Nonetheless, trade in services 
might also result in the movement of persons. No matter this distinction, one will 
always influence the other. The provisions included in the agreements concerning 
8) For further elaboration on the issue of competence concerning legal migration, see: S. Peers, “Legisla-
tive Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, Issue 10 (2008), pp. 219–247.
9) Peers, supra note 8, pp. (219) 239 (247).
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liberalization of services10 will determine the possibility to ‘migrate’ on a legal 
basis from the third country to a EU Member State to temporary perform an 
economic activity, but the provisions regarding an eventual long term residence 
status or visa issues remain in the immigration policy realm. This link is illus-
trated e.g. in the communication on a community immigration policy,11 where the 
admission for economic migrants is clearly linked to the respect of provisions 
in bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force, with a specific reference 
to the scheduled commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS). The connection between migration and trade in services is further 
recognized in a number of subsequent communications.12 In the following ana-
lysis it will be established that legal economic migration and the migration-
development nexus is often a combination of both (infra, section 4).
2.2. In Search of the Right Policy Framework
The relevance of migration, and especially in connection to development and in 
relations with third countries has, for a long time, not been topping the agenda. 
The emergence of the external dimension of migration eventually led to the cre-
ation of a High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG), 
however there was no question of cooperation with the identified third coun-
tries.13 It was only since the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice 
following the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Programme14 that the first steps 
towards a common comprehensive approach on migration were taken. It was recog-
nized that this could only be reached in partnership, dialogue and cooperation 
with third countries. This cooperation was however still regarded from a security 
point of view, limited in content and without clear priority objectives.15 It was 
only in the following years that the idea of possible benefits of migration for 
development (the positive migration-development nexus) through legal economic 
migration, whilst mitigating the negative effects of brain drain, was gradually 
integrated in the relation with third countries.16 Suggestions to reach both 
10) Under the old provision of Article 133 TEC a concurrent shared competence and under the current 
art. 207 TFEU an exclusive competence.
11) COM(2000)757.
12) For example: Communication on “Migration and Development: some concrete orientations”, 
01.09.2005, COM(2005)390, p. 26; Communication “On Circular Migration and Mobility Partner-
ships between the European Union and third countries”, 16.05.2007, COM(2007)248, p. 5 and p. 17.
13) J. Niessen, “International Migration on the EU Foreign Policy Agenda”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law, Issue 4 (1999), pp. 483–496.
14) Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999. 
15) M-H Chou, European Union Migration Strategy towards West-Africa: the Origin and Outlook of ‘Mobil-
ity Partnerships’ with Cape Verde and Senegal, 23–25 April 2009, 8 (26). 
16) Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000; COM(2000)757; 
Communication on “Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union’s relations with Third Coun-
tries”, 03.12.2002, COM(2002)703.
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objectives were e.g., temporary migration and return and the creation of a Euro-
pean Code of Conduct addressing recruitment of health professionals in develop-
ing countries. The emergence for a more comprehensive approach was characterized 
from the start by a focus on the African continent, in particular Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as a priority area. Nonetheless, illegal migration and the limited attention 
for the positive development aspects of migration were still the main features.17
The new trend was endorsed in the Hague Programme,18 where the absence of 
a genuine fully fledged external policy and a coherent comprehensive approach 
linking migration, development cooperation and humanitarian aid was acknowl-
edged. The first request to the Commission to draft a strategy on all the external 
aspects of the area of freedom, security and justice resulted mainly in a focus on 
illegal immigration, with only little reference to the ACP.19 This changed only 
later20 and finally found its reflection in the Global Approach.21 The external 
dimension of migration, calling for broad ranging action in the short term, geo-
graphically prioritized the African continent, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, 
next to the Mediterranean region. Even though the focus was still centered upon 
the negative migration-development nexus and the security aspects of migration, 
the thematic priorities were slowly broadened to legal migration as well. How-
ever, this was left to more specific initiatives. The communication on migration and 
development22 further consolidates this new found idea of possible benefits of 
migration for development, while at the same time limiting the negative conse-
quences. The second request to the Commission to present a policy plan on legal 
migration eventually23 resulted into the Policy Plan on Legal Migration.24 As a 
consequence of the rejection by the Member States of a horizontal approach to all 
migrant categories, four new directives were presented. These included condi-
tions for highly qualified workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees 
and remunerated trainees. It is thus clear from the outset that the opportunities 
for economic migration are limited to those in the interest of the Union/Member 
States, not addressing the request of the developing countries for legal options for 
lower or unskilled migrants. Moreover, it remained to be seen if the suggestions 
17) Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 20 and 21 June 2002 (e.g. using develop ment aid 
as an instrument of pressure in negotiations concerning immigration).
18) Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 4 and 5 November 2004.
19) Communication on “A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice”, 12.09.2004, COM(2005)491.
20) Communication on “Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to 
Hampton Court”, 30.11.2004, COM(2005)621.
21) Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 15 and 16 December 2005.
22) COM(2005)390.
23) Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, 11.01.2005, COM(2004) 811.
24) Communication on a “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”, 21.12.2005, COM(2005)669. The drafted 
roadmap, for the remaining period of the Hague Programme (2006–2009), planned feasibility studies 
and proposals for 2007–2008, but it was not until 2009 effective measures/proposals were intended to 
be taken.
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made to unite both interests, such as through temporary, return and circular 
migration and measures to mitigate eventual brain drain, would effectively be 
included. The identified problems of selective national immigration policies, lack 
of community competence and political will on the part of the Member States for 
a common approach on ethical recruitment, aggravating the brain drain problem, 
led to specific initiatives to address the issue.25 The European Programme for 
action to tackle critical shortages of health workers in developing countries (PfA)26 
confirms the identification of Africa as a ‘brain drain problem area’ and provides 
for a set of actions on the country, regional and global level.
In sum, since the end of 2005 and during 2006, the thematic priorities of a 
positive migration-development nexus, and the search for more coherence as well 
as the geographical focus on the ACP, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, emerged 
on top of the pyramid of EU priorities. As has the idea, postulated at interna-
tional level, that temporary and circular migration facilitate legal migration and 
at the same time address the brain drain problem. This point of view is also 
reflected in the EU Position for the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development.27 The clear emphasis on the return aspect of circular migration 
demonstrates however that it was still seen as an effective instrument for decreas-
ing illegal migration in the interest of the Member States.28 The search for more 
coherence between the different policies, in conformity with the Policy Coherence 
for Development (PCD),29 and the need for concrete actions was also recognized 
in the European Consensus on Development.30 This demonstrates that the set policy 
objectives had not led to the expected results.
The Global Approach 31 was strengthened geographically by including the east-
ern and south-eastern neighbours of the Union and for the first time circular 
25) Communication on an “EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Human Resources for Health in 
Developing Countries”, 12.12.2005, COM(2005)642.
26) Communication on “The European Programme for Action to tackle the critical shortage of health 
workers in developing countries (2007–2013)”, 21.12.2006, COM(2006)870. The programme was 
endorsed at the GAERC Council of May 2007: 2799th General Affairs and External Relations Council 
meeting, General Affairs, 14 May 2007, p. 12.
27) Communication on the “Contribution to the EU Position for the United Nations’ High Level Dia-
logue on Migration and Development”, 14.7.2006, COM(2006)409.
28) S. Carrera and R. Hernandeze I Sagrera, The Externalization of the EU’s labour Immigration Policy. 
Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships?, CEPS Working Document, N° 321, October 2009, 
pp. 11–12 (32). 
29) Communication on “Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating progress towards attaining 
the Millennium Development Goals”, 12.04.2005, COM(2005)134.
30) Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union 
Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, OJ C 46/1 of 24 February 2006. The European Con-
sensus included for the first time a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member 
States and Community levels, in development co-operation.
31) Communication on “The Global Approach to Migration on year one: Towards a comprehensive Euro-
pean migration policy”, 30.11.2006, COM(2006)735.
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migration, mobility packages and the brain drain issue were included into one 
single policy. It must however be said that the inclusion of legal migration 
remained limited to certain categories of migrants and on a needs-based approach. 
The request32 to translate policy statements into solutions through concrete pro-
posals on circular and temporary migration resulted into a framework for circular 
migration and mobility partnerships.33 Despite the evolution since 2006 from 
mobility packages to mobility partnerships, the stress seemed to remain on the 
interests of the Union and the participating Member States. The strict eligibility 
criteria, focusing on cooperation regarding illegal migration, for third countries 
to participate in such a mobility partnership, clearly illustrate this point. One can 
doubt whether developing countries, taken into account insufficient legislative 
and administrative means and financial resources, are able to fulfil the require-
ments on illegal migration. In addition, despite the emphasis on the need for full 
compliance with fundamental rights, earlier readmission agreements demonstrate 
that this commitment is at least doubtful.34 The commitments of the Union and 
the participating Member States were formulated in a much broader sense, e.g. “it 
needed to lead to improved opportunities for legal migration, based on labour 
needs of the Member States, and to assisting the third country to manage legal 
migration flows”. In addition, legal migration options appear to be limited to 
certain categories of immigrants. The possibility to include measures for circular 
migration and other measures to address the risk of brain drain, were unclear and 
formulated in a very soft manner.
Circular migration was defined as being a form of migration that is managed 
in a way that allows some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two 
countries.35 It was argued that circular migration was a step forward in compari-
son to temporary migration, where the return of the migration to the country of 
origin was considered to be the end of the cycle. Notwithstanding the fact that 
circular migration was seen as an answer to create legal migration channels as well 
as a possible measure mitigating the risk of brain drain, the underlying reasons 
seemed to linger on illegal migration and to guarantee circularity, more in par-
ticular the return of those who are not or less in the interest of the Member States 
32) Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 14 and 15 December 2006. 
33) Communication “On Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union 
and third countries”, 16.05.2007, COM(2007)248.
34) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/may/12readmission.htm, EU: Statewatch analysis no 17, 
Readmission agreements and the EC external migration law, consulted on 31 October 2006 and 5 April 
2010; C. Billet, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of External Dimension of the EU’s 
Fight against Irregular Immigration. An Assessment after Ten Years of Practice”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Issue 12 (2010), pp. (45) 71–77 (79).
35) This consists of both migrants that (temporary) return to their country of origin, but have obtained 
a permanent right of residence in the host country and migrants that only have a temporary right of 
residence.
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to permanently settle on their territory.36 It remains to be seen whether or not this 
new tool will in practice be an actual implementation of a comprehensive policy, 
but the policy framework was far from promising.
Notwithstanding these measures, the challenge to develop a common com-
prehen sive immigration policy continued.37 The numerous delicate issues38 sur-
rounding the mobility partnerships and circular migration, hamper in advance a 
sound imple men tation that takes the need for coherence and comprehensiveness 
into consideration. For both initiatives, the matter of the division of competence 
between the Com munity and the Member States, the integration of the develop-
ment aspect into national policies, the need for a solid legal framework on mobil-
ity for circular migration and the requirement of guarantees for voluntary return, 
the principle of Community preference, are reoccurring issues. In identifying 
Moldova and Cape Verde as test cases for the mobility partnerships, the impor-
tance of differentiation, was stressed hence excluding a general legal framework 
concerning mobility partnerships for all third countries. In defining circular 
migration, a more dynamic approach does not seem to have been taken into con-
sideration and the issue of temporariness seems to be overemphasized and the 
circularity aspect under ex posed.39 The established principles, actions and tools 
towards a common immigra tion policy,40 taking into account the new evolutions in 
external relations such as the 7th Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employ-
ment following the 2007 EU-Africa Lisbon Summit, served the same purpose. 
The vision of a policy based on prosperity, solidarity and security, aiming for a 
more coordinated, coherent, efficient and integrated approach, demonstrated the 
persistent aspirations.
The problem, confirming the importance of coherence and possible encroach-
ment of migration on the priorities of the development policy, also appeared in 
the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).41 The analysis of 
36) See note 28, CEPS Working Document, N° 321, October 2009, pp. 14–15 (32). The main critique 
is that bilateral schemes/agreement on circularity insufficiently address the rights of the migrant and 
increase dependency.
37) Communication “Towards a Common Immigration Policy”, 05.12.2007, COM(2007)780; Commis-
sion Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication “Towards a Common Immig ration 
Policy”, Interim progress report on the Global Approach to Migration, 05.12.2007, COM(2007)1632.
38) 2839th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, General Affairs, 10 December 2007, 
p. 24 et seq.
39) Circular migration is “the temporary, legal movement of people between one or more Member States 
and particular third countries, whereby third country nationals take up legal employment opportunities 
in the EU or persons legally residing in the EU go to their country of origin” (2839th General Affairs and 
External Relations Council meeting, General Affairs, 10 December 2007, p. 26). 
40) Communication on “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools”, 
17.06.2008, COM(2008)359.
41) Communication on “The EU – a global player for development. Speeding up progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals”, 9 April 2008, COM(2008) 177 and the accompanying Commission 
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the existing measures and debates in doctrine and praxis,42 some focusing on the 
need for policy changes in the developing countries (e.g. training and retention), 
some targeting the developed countries (e.g. recruitment), some emphasizing on 
the role of circular migration and temporariness43 and others doubting it,44 dem-
onstrate that not one answer is sacred. A solution will be the result of a combina-
tion of measures. Regardless of the choices made or combinations found, the 
difficulty of finding legally binding and concrete actions was again brought to the 
table. An important fact was the recognition of the need for a combination of 
voluntary with structural and compulsory measures in the brain drain frame-
work. As the analysis of the PfA shows the evolution to an actual common or even 
global code, with compulsory commitments, instead of unilateral and/or volun-
tary and non-binding schemes, such as in the UK,45 the EPSU-HOSPEEM Code 
of Conduct46 and the adopted WHO Code,47 seems to become more and more a 
utopia. Despite some positive measures, the global picture is one of insufficient 
implementation, coordination deficiency, problems in aid effectiveness and a lack 
of complete information/data.48
Following suit to actually implement the Global Approach’s tenet49 a new stim-
ulus was taken.50 The five political commitments adopted in the European Pact 
on Immigration and Asylum51 and also the follow up52 do not however improve 
Staff Working paper, “Policy Coherence for Development. Climate Change/Energy/Biofuels, Migration 
and Research”, SEC(2008)434/2, pp. 23–27 and pp. 30–34–35.
42) For example, some pleading for bond schemes – posing possible problems with regard tot the freedom 
of movement, others preferring compensation schemes – posing practical problems such as the tax payer 
paying the consequences instead of the private institution or encouraging migration. 
43) M. Amin and A. Mattoo, “Migration from Zambia: Ensuring Temporariness through Coopera tion”, 
Washington DC: The World Bank, January 2006. 
44) E.g. A. Triandafyllidou, Attempting the Impossible? The Prospects and Limits of Mobility Partnerships and 
Circular Migration, ELIAMEP Thesis, January 2009; http://migreurop.org/Article1627.html?lang=en. 
45) http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digital asset/
dh_4097734.pdf. 
46) http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=8639. 
47) http://www.medicusmundi.org/en/contributions/news/2009/WHO_EB126_on_code_of_practice/ 
?searchterm=WHO%20Code%20of%20practice; 63th World Health Assembly, “WHO Global Code 
of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel”, Agenda item 11.5, WHA63.16, 
21 May 2010.
48) Commission Staff Working Document, “European programme for action to tackle the critical short-
age of health workers in developing countries (2007–2013) – Progress report on implementation”, 
16.09.2008, SEC(2008)2476.
49) The external dimension of the Union’s common migration policy in dialogue and partnership with 
third countries, uniting the management of legal migration, control of illegal migration and make migra-
tion a positive force for development.
50) Communication on “Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing coordination, 
coherence and synergies”, 08.09.2008, COM(2008)611.
51) Note from the Presidency to the Council, “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”, 24 Septem-
ber 2008.
52) Council Conclusions on the follow-up of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (3018th 
General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, 3 June 2010). 
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much to the picture. For example, the Pact emphasizes the importance of attrac-
tion for highly qualified workers, confirming the problem of selective economic 
migration. Moreover, the priority areas show a clear commitment on fighting 
illegal migration. The balanced approach leading to an actual partnership seems 
thus a distant perspective. The overview of geographical focus on the African 
continent proves that a framework had been set, now its implementation needed 
to be guaranteed.
Within the prospect of a new five year programme, the Hague Programme was 
subjected to an evaluation.53 After the summary of achievements – such as the 
Blue Card Directive,54 a better integration of migration into development policy 
and other policy domains, enhancing the dialogue and cooperation with e.g. 
Africa, and new tools such as the mobility partnerships, and an overview of some 
crippled ambitions – such as in the area of legal migration,55 the overall conclu-
sion was that progress had been made. Although some drawbacks, in particular 
finding a balanced approach and time needed to move on from policy pledges to 
action, taken as a whole these initiatives may indeed be seen as stepping stones to 
a comprehensive migration policy. In the drafting of the new programme a lot of 
emphasis was put on the external dimension. The envisaged dynamic immigra-
tion policy56 included extending the dialogue and cooperation to other areas such 
as the Caribbean, without losing sight of the priority areas. In general, the sugges-
tions made come down to an actual implementation of the Global Approach and 
its new tools. Apparently the listed priorities seem to tip the balance of migration 
policy in exploitation to the benefit of the EU and the Member States and less in 
coherence with the development principle.
The Stockholm Programme (2010–2014),57 endorsed by the European Council 
in December 2009,58 and the proposed Action Plan59 do not only include the 
53) Communication on “Justice, Freedom and Security since 2005: An evaluation of the Hague Pro-
gramme and Action Plan”, 10.06.2009, COM(2009)263.
54) The directive is considered to be not much more than a first step towards harmonization, pointing out 
the limited possibilities to move and reside between Member States as a set back. The issue of brain drain 
is not mentioned. SEC(2007)766, p. 21.
55) Identifying the unanimity rule as one of the reason not more ambitious and long term results have 
been achieved. See: SEC(2007)766, p. 20.
56) The vision of the dynamic immigration policy further includes a concerted policy better in line with 
labour-market requirements of the Member States and is seen as a proactive policy based on a European 
status for legal immigrants and the control of illegal immigration.
57) Note from the Presidency to the General Affairs Council and European Council, “The Stock-
holm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens”, 2 December 
2009. 
58) European Council, Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 2009.
59) Communication on “Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens. Action 
Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme”, COM(2010)171. The Council notes that some sugges-
tions made by the Commission are not in line with the Stockholm Program and others are not reflected 
in the Communication and urges the Commission to take only those initiatives that are in full conformity 
with the Stockholm Programme (Council Conclusions on the Commission Communication “Delivering 
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external dimension in the general framework, but also incorporate the new Lisbon 
treaty provisions. The Programme and Action Plan confirm the need for a com-
prehensive and sustainable European migration and asylum policy framework 
and consolidate the Global Approach. The mobility partnerships and circular 
migration remain important tools and initiatives are suggested to include other 
legal migration options. It is however clear that security concerns cover the major-
ity of issues considered and that there is not only a continuing need for more 
coherence, but also for a further development and an actual implementation of 
the comprehensive approach. In analyzing the Stockholm Programme and its 
suggested Action Plan, it becomes apparent that the internal-external/security-
mobility-development balance is still not reached.
Sequential stepping stones to a comprehensive common migration policy have 
been taken. An evolution from an internal to an external dimension in dialogue 
and partnership with third countries, has taken place, encompassing not only ele-
ments concerning illegal migration but also on legal labour migration and main-
streaming migration into development to the benefit of both. Nevertheless, 
speaking of a major leap from security to legal mobility for the high and the lower 
skilled and migration serving both partners, also mitigating the negative effects, 
would go too far. It is only fair to conclude that ambitious policy objectives have 
been set and the first steps to a common and balanced approach have been taken, 
but there is still a long way to go.60 Foundations are laid, but problems such as 
coherence and the fear of Member States losing control over their labour markets, 
have hampered the translation of pledges into tangible achievements and the cre-
ation of a common comprehensive approach.
3. Legal Commitments on Economic Migration Jeopardizing the Development 
of Third Countries?
Policy frameworks are not an end in itself, they need to be reflected by legal bind-
ing commitments. This section will address whether the search over the years for 
a comprehensive approach knows a similar evolution in the legal framework, and 
what options have been found to combine mobility in the interests of both, with-
out putting development at risk.
an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens – Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme” (COM(2010)171final), 3018th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, 
10 June 2010.
60) This is also confirmed in the Mid-Term review of the Thematic Programme “Cooperation with 
third countries in the areas of migration and asylum” (Issues Paper, 18.03.2010) identifying the 
balancing of the three dimensions of the Global Approach as one of the main challenges ahead, 
mainly by improving labour migration and mobility for third country nationals. This requires a 
more long term, strategic and evidence based policy on migration. 
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3.1. Legal Commitments: In Search for The Right Combination
The mobility of third country nationals can be facilitated through visa require-
ments, however not creating (new) channels for migration or a right of entry.61 
The regulation on short stay visa contains visa exemptions for certain categories, 
e.g. for school pupils in the context of a school excursions. The reluctance of the 
Member States is again illustrated by Article 4, making it possible to provide 
for an exception from the exemption of visa requirements for Annex II nationals 
carrying out a paid activity during their stay.62 Only recently, nationals from 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Mauritius, Saint-Kitts and Nevis and 
Seychelles (all ACP countries) were exempted from the visa requirement upon 
conclusion of bilateral agreements. Such a short-stay visa waiver agreements were 
signed in May 2009 and provisionally applied from 28 May 2009 on.63 However, 
this visa waiver is clearly limited in scope, exempting all persons travelling for the 
purpose of carrying out a paid activity, covering persons entering for the purpose 
of a remunerated activity as an employee or as a service provider.64 The actual use 
of the possibility to require a visa for persons carrying out a paid activity during 
their stay, gives evidence of a slightly different image regarding the reluctance of 
the Member States.65 The notifications provided for by the Member States dem-
onstrate that for the abovementioned countries ‘only’ half of the Member States 
(25) actually apply this visa requirement.66 A nuance must thus be made with 
regard to the Member States’ position. Nevertheless, this possibility remains a 
choice of the individual Member State and creates differences between the Mem-
ber States. Another option facilitating movement based on one’s occupational 
status is the possibility of the multiple-entry visa that can be valid for one, two or 
multiple entries, with a maximum validity of five years. The issuance of such a 
visa is however dependent on the proven need to travel frequently and ‘integrity 
61) See: S. Peers, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union”, European Journal 
of Migration and Law, Issue 9 (2007), pp. (229) 234–235 (251).
62) Council Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006 of 21 December 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/
2001 listing third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt form that requirement, OJ L 29/10 of 3 February 2007.
63) E.g. Council Decisions of 6 April 2009 on the signing and provisional application of the Agreement 
between the European Community and the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis on the short-stay visa 
waiver, OJ L 169/37 of 30 June 2009.
64) Based on the Joint Declarations of the respective agreements: some businesspersons, sportspersons and 
artists, journalist and intra-corporate trainees are normally not covered (L 169/38) and are thus exempted 
from a visa requirement.
65) Information pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the 
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, Exceptions to the exemption from the visa 
requirement by virtue of Article 4(3), 25–29. (http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/bor ders/
docs/notification_visa_539_2001_en.pdf, consulted on 1 December 2010).
66) The Member States in this case, with the exemption of the United Kingdom and Ireland, that do not 
apply the Regulation.
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and reliability’.67 The evolution in the EU’s visa regime is not further restricting 
mobility, but the exemptions are strict and leave persons carrying out a paid activ-
ity in the hands of the Member States.
Following the communication on a community immigration policy,68 the direc-
tive on the status of long-term residents69 was the first initiative in the area of 
conditions of admission and residence since the entry into force of the Amster-
dam Treaty. It is more a measure in the framework of guaranteeing successful 
integration. Besides that, a lot was left to the Member States. Only a very small 
step was taken by providing that a third country national does not necessarily lose 
the possibility for a long-term resident status because of temporary absence of the 
territory of a Member State (Articles 4 and 9). It thus provides a small possibility 
of circularity, but it does not lead to a real facilitation of mobility. The directive, 
being a reflection of the policy framework of that time, lacks a clear development 
connection. The directive on family reunification70 is in keeping with that.
In absence of a common approach on labour migration, initiatives were adopted 
for specific categories of migrants, namely a directive concerning migration for 
study purposes, pupil exchange,71 unremunerated trainees and voluntary services72 
and one concerning researchers.73 Both concern migration categories that are by 
definition temporary and respectively Articles 12 to 15 and Article 8 limit the 
residence permit to a specified period of time. Researchers can be considered 
‘temporary migrants’ by their very nature. Their activities are in general confined 
to specific projects and timing, they move around frequently and settle for differ-
ent periods of time in different countries.74 Overall, the course of their career is 
characterized by short term contracts and mobility should be considered an added 
value on their CV.75 The suggestion to facilitate the issuance of short term visa 
67) Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 estab-
lishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243/ of 15 September 2009, Article 24, para-
graph 1 and 2. (Applicable form 5 April 2010)
68) COM(2000)757. 
69) Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nation-
als who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44 of 23 January 2004.
70) Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 
251/12 of 3 October 2003.
71) May be limited by Member States on a reciprocity basis (Article 9 (2)).
72) Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third coun-
try nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training and voluntary services, 
OJ L 375/12 of 23 December 2004. (A Spring 2009 proposal suggested to extend the directive to remu-
nerated trainees and au-pairs).
73) Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purpose of scientific research, OJ L 289/15 of 3 November 2005.
74) Communication on “The presentation of a proposal for a directive and two proposals for recommen-
dations on the admission of third-country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Com-
munity”, 16.03.2004, COM(2004)178, 5.
75) Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying document to the Communication “Better 
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further endorses this point and moreover is in conformity with the need to take 
into consideration the possible detrimental effects on third countries, namely the 
brain drain issue, and the need for circularity and the maintenance of contact 
with the country of origin.76 However, analyzing the preparatory work for the 
directive as well as the linked recommendations and the final versions, it appears 
that the temporary aspect of this kind of migrants, nor circularity for that matter, 
is necessarily a priority issue for the Union/Member States. Several measures 
appear to be aimed at attracting and keeping these third country nationals.77 
Despite the recognition of possible brain drain problems for developing coun-
tries, the expressed concerns and suggestions on this matter have not received any 
legal follow up.78 There is little coherence with other legislative initiatives and no 
provisions that ensure the contribution to the development in the host country. 
The preamble of the directive concerning researchers, brings to mind that the 
implementation of the directive may not encourage the brain drain from emerg-
ing or developing countries, referring to necessary back-up measures such as the 
reintegration of the researcher in the host country and measures concerning the 
movement of researchers in partnership with third countries. This vague statement 
Careers and more mobility: a European partnership for researchers”, Impact Assessment, SEC(2008)1911, 
14, 20 and 60.
76) COM(2004)178, 4 and 42 (46); Report on the proposal for a Council directive on a specific proce-
dure for admitting third-country nationals for purposes of scientific research, on the proposal for a Coun-
cil recommendation to facilitate the admission of third-country nationals to carry out scientific research 
in the European Community and on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council recommenda-
tion to facilitate the issue by the Member States of uniform short-stay visas for researchers from third 
countries travelling within the European Community for the purpose of scientific research, A6–0054/2005 
final, 01.04.2005, 23 and 30.
77) Article 8 of the directive is the provision concerning the duration of the residence permit (at least one 
year or if less, for the duration of the project). However this permit can be renewed if the conditions are 
still met, meaning also when a new hosting agreement is signed, without any time limitations nor flank-
ing measures to address possible consequences in the country of origin. Other examples are: Article 13 
provides for a facilitation of mobility within the Union and Article 9 concerns the family members of the 
researcher. Although the proposal did not consider this matter, the issue was dealt with under Directive 
2003/86, the proposal for a recommendation (issued pending the implementation of the directive) did 
and underlined the very important factor of family reunification for researchers of third countries who 
plan to settle in Europe. COM(2004)178, 5 and 34. In the final version of the recommendation (OJ L 
289/26 of 3 November 2005) this was weakened and despite the fact that in the final version of the Direc-
tive (Article 9) this remains an option for the Member States, it is clear this contributes to the facilitated 
integration of the third country researcher. The proposal for the recommendations advocates the Member 
States to abstain from putting a time limit on the admission to the labour market and aims to ensure that 
residence permits can be renewed without (major) restrictions. COM(2004)178, 34 and 39, points 1(c) 
and 2(b). Also points 1(c) and 2(b) in the final version. 
78) Reflections on possible brain drain problems can be found in: consideration 6 in the proposal for the 
Directive, the proposal for the recommendation explicitly provided for derogations in case of measures at 
counteracting the brain drain. COM(2004)178, 23 and 34–39, points 1(c) and 2(b). Also in: Opinion 
of the Committee of the Regions on the Communication, OJ C 71/1 of 22 March 2005, points 1.3. and 
1.15 and the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, OJ C 120/60 of 20 May 2005, 
points 3.9.1. and 3.9.2.
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did however not lead to clear commitments in the directive, nor offered guaran-
tees that the acquired skills can actually benefit the country of origin.79 Moreover, 
it appears from the Communi ca tion on circular migration and mobility partner-
ships that not enough measures were incorporated to guarantee actual circularity. 
In addition the Committee of the Re gions, in the framework of the Blue Card 
Directive (infra), pointed out that according to reports of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), initiatives for the admission of skilled workers, 
amongst those the measures of the Commission concerning circular migration, 
“tend to intensive brain drain concerns”.80
In line with the horizontal approach of the Policy Plan on Legal Migration, the 
directive for highly qualified professionals finally took form.81 In taking stock of 
the best options available, it appeared that a balance between positive effects for 
the proper market and negative effects for the source country is not easy to find 
and that whatever the option taken accompanying measures would be necessary 
to address the negative consequences.82 Following the manifestation of the reality 
of the brain drain problem, in particular from Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Caribbean,83 it is only logic that the proposal on the directive84 was received with 
much reservation.85 Criticism and concerns on the consequences in aggravating 
the brain drain problem were refuted by the argument that the directive would 
contain provisions on ethical recruitment, in the form of limitation or even a ban, 
and by measures that assure circular migration.86 The Blue Card directive was 
79) In the preamble of the recommendation of the Council to facilitate admission for third-country 
nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community, similar wordings can be found 
(consideration 8). Suggestions to provide derogations from the general rule to renew and provide for 
work en residence permits for an unlimited period of time based on the need of the country of origin were 
not kept in the final version. It was considered that these provisions lacked the clarity and precision 
required for a legal text. Still, no valuable alternative was made to address possible brain drain problems. 
COM(2004)178, 34–39; Report of the European Parliament, A6–0054/2005 final, 01.04.2005, 20–21 
and 45–46. 
80) Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on “A global approach to migration: developing a Euro-
pean policy on labour immigration in conjunction with relations with third countries”, OJ C 257/20 of 
9 October 2008, point 59. Also the Opinion of the EESC on ‘EU immigration and cooperation policy 
with countries of origin to foster development’ (OJ 44/91 of 16 February 2008) reflects the lack of a 
sound legislation concerning circular migration.
81) I would like to thank dr. Daniel Wunderlich for his comments and suggestions regarding the contri-
bution of the EP, in the framework of the UACES Conference in Bath, February 2010.
82) Proposal from the Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying to the Pro-
posal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the 
purpose of highly qualified employment, Impact assessment, 23.09.2007, SEC(2007)1403.
83) In percentages: 45,59% of high skilled workers comes from ‘Other Africa’ (p. 11) (other numbers on 
p. 109 suggest 43,39%) and 8,54% from the Caribbean.
84) Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purpose of highly qualified employment, 23.09.2007, COM(2007)637.
85) E.g. 6th Ordinary Session of the Labour and Social Affairs Commission of the African Union, 21–25 
April 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, “Progress Report on the Follow-up of the Implementation on Migra-
tion Instruments”.
86) COM(2007)248 and Justice and Home Affairs, 2827th Council meeting, Brussels, 8 and 9 Novem-
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presented as the answer to enhance the competitiveness of the EU economy and 
at the same time limit brain drain from developing countries. Nonetheless the 
European Pact, in its commitment on legal migration, already seemed to be a 
‘bad’ herald on the actual commitments in the directive, stressing the importance 
of attractiveness, but not putting the same stress on the brain drain problem.87
Finally the long-lasting exploration for an instrument addressing economic 
immigration resulted into the so-called Blue Card Directive88 and the preamble 
(considerations 21, 22 and 24) seemed promising.89 The identification of what 
was considered highly qualified employment was not unanimous amongst the 
Member States and was not an easy concept to define. From the definition in 
Article 2 it appears clearly that only employees who have adequate and specific 
competences proven by higher professional qualifications, namely diploma or 
acquired professional experience, are covered. Further eligibility criteria are set 
out in Article 5. Some third country nationals are excluded from the scope of the 
directive, e.g. those entering under the GATS provisions (infra, section 4).90 For 
the first time specific provisions were included to address the brain drain prob-
lem. Where the Commission proposal91 was a good starting point, the commit-
ments were strengthened by adding some amendments made by the European 
Parliament.92 The importance of ethical recruitment and cooperation with the 
third country involved appears clearly from recital 20 of the preamble in the 
ber 2007; 10th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, Brussels, 16 September 2008, Communiqué 
13121/08 (Presse 260).
87) http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plaquette_EN.pdf; Note from the Presidency to the 
Council, “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”, 24 September 2008, p. 5.
88) Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155/17 of 18 June 2009. The 
directive was adopted under the old Article 63 (3,a) and 4 TEC.
89) It appears already from the preamble of the proposal however that initially more emphasis was put on 
the brain drain issue, with special mention of Sub-Saharan Africa. This was not incorporated in the final 
version.
90) In the Commission’s proposal Article 3(f ) refers “to third country nationals entering a Member State 
under commitments contained in an international agreement facilitating the entry and temporary stay of 
certain categories of trade and investment-related natural persons”. The EP, amendment 20, explicitly 
added “in particular intra-corporate transferees, providers of contractual services and trainees with higher 
education qualifications who are covered by the Community’s obligations under the GATS”. Despite the 
fact that this specification was not included in the final Article 3 (g) it is clear that this implies a referral 
to the commitments under the GATS.
91) COM(2007)637.
92) European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council direc-
tive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qua-
lified employment (COM(2007)637 – C-6–0011/2007 – 2007/0228(CNS)), OJ C 16 E/224 of 
22 January 2010. The Committee on Development (Opinion (3.9.2008) for the Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) clearly raised the stakes on the problematic consequences of the 
directive on the brain drain problem, the lack of strong legal commitments and the problems surround-
ing circular migration (e.g. stimulating circular migration through dual citizenship and mutual recogni-
tion of diplomas).
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amendments.93 The suggestion made by the Commission94 to include the possi-
bility that professions listed in any agreement between the Community or the 
Community and its Member States on the one hand, and one or more third 
countries, on the other hand, do not fall under the Directive if so agreed, in order 
to assure ethical recruitment and the protection of human resources in the signa-
tory third state, was included (Article 3, paragraph 3). However, there was an 
important change made to the proposal.95 In the final version the Article changed 
the possibility of such an agreement to agreements between the Community and/
or Member States. Hence, the possible conclusion of such an agreement can now 
be a unilateral measure by a Member State, encompassing possible coordination 
problems. Even though this reflects the commitment to address the negative con-
sequences, this provision is too weak and leaves too much in de hands of the 
Member States offering no legal certainty. Up until now no such agree ments were 
concluded, nor were specific clauses included into recent agreements (see e.g. the 
EPA). In the same sense, but based on national decisions, a Member State may 
refuse an application to ensure ethical recruitment in vulnerable sectors (Article 
8, paragraph 4). This amendment (35), made by the EP is again an important 
step forward towards tackling the brain drain problem, but again containing no 
actual obligation, only including a possible ground for refusal, and leaving it 
strongly dependent on the Member States decision. The only actual strong com-
mitment suggested by the EP on the issue in Article 5bis96 was not incorporated 
in the final version of the directive.97 The conclusion may be that the additional 
amendments suggested by the EP show for a stronger commitment, but the even-
tual results are weak obligations or rather only possibilities and there are no legal 
consequences for not applying principles of ethical recruitment. The provisions 
should have been combined with compulsory conditions or an EU Code of Con-
duct on Ethical recruitment which is transparent, binding and applicable to all 
Member States. Furthermore, Article 5 holds the criteria for admission and pro-
vides in paragraph 3 for a salary threshold. This threshold may however be low-
93) The final version of recital 22 in the directive bears closer resemblance to the Commission’s suggestion 
than the EP’s, but the specific referral to Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development (Tripoli) 
as well as the quest for a comprehensive migration policy was not taken on.
94) SEC(2007)1403, p. 65.
95) The suggestion made in amendment 22 by the EP to add explicitly “the sectors vital to achieving the 
UN MDG, in particular the health and education sectors, and in sectors vital to the ability of developing 
countries to deliver basic social services” was not included.
96) “Avoiding shortage of highly qualified workers in third countries. The MS shall not actively seek to 
attract highly qualified workers in sectors that are already subject, or are expected to be subject, to a short-
age of highly skilled workers in the third country. This applies to the health and education sectors in 
particular.”
97) The implications made in recital 20 of the EP’s amendments for compensations measures (“Member 
States should offer concrete support for training of professionals in key sectors weakened by the exodus 
of talent”), just as European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) suggested (Opinion of the EESC 
on ‘EU immigration and cooperation policy with countries of origin to foster development’, OJ 44/91 of 
16 February 2008, point 9.12.), have no reflection in the Directive. 
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ered for employment in professions which are in particular need of third country 
national workers and which belong to the major group 1, managers, and group 2, 
professionals, of the ISCO (International Standard of Occupation Classification).98 
The latter also includes for example, health professionals and teaching profes-
sionals. This seems to be in contradiction with any effort to mitigate brain drain.
In addition and to promote circular migration,99 derogation from the periods 
of absence from the territory of the Member States to obtain and retain the status 
of long-term resident, are provided for (Article 16, paragraphs 3 and 4). The 
Commission constrained this possible derogation to situations where the third 
country national could present evidence that he/she had been absent from the 
Community territory to exercise an economic activity in an employed or self-
employed capacity, or to perform a voluntary service, or study in his/her own 
country of origin (preamble 17 and Article 17). The EP considered these condi-
tions however an additional admini strative burden, creating disproportionate dif-
ficulties. In the final version of Article 16, paragraph 5 these compulsory conditions 
of proof have been changed into an option. This creates a much broader option 
of circularity, making it also possible to temporarily return to the country of ori-
gin for family or personal reasons.100 However an additional change in the final 
provision (Article 16, paragraph 5) again requires a refining of the relevance in the 
brain drain framework. Whereas in the proposal and the EP resolution it was an 
obligation (the derogations shall apply only when these conditions are fulfilled), 
this commitment evolved again into an instrument of the Member States where 
“the derogation may be restricted to cases where such a proof of return to an eco-
nomic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity, or to perform a volun-
tary service, or study” is given. On the one hand, the additional changes are a 
positive evolution broadening the scope for an eventual circular migration; on the 
other hand, they again leave much uncertainty on their application and create 
possible differences between the Member States. Furthermore, there is no guaran-
tee for a positive contribution to the development of the country of origin. 
Besides, there is a limited coordination between the different directives. Nothing 
is hindering e.g. students or researchers to stay after their studies or hosting agree-
ments under the Blue Card Directives, if they comply with the set criteria and if 
the Member State in question so allows.101
Finally, the implementing measures (Article 20), in particular the communica-
tion of information from the Member States who apply the possible refusal of an 
application based on Article 8, paragraph 4 (supra), allow to monitor recruitment 
 98) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/docs/resol08.pdf. 
 99) In principle the standard period of validity of the EU Blue Card is temporary, but this can be renewed 
and the acquiring of a long-term resident status is facilitated.
100) As was suggested by the EP in amendment 8 (recital 17 preamble). It is however remarkable that these 
conditions of proof were not removed in the relevant provision (amendment 52, Article 17).
101) This appears clearly form consideration 8 of the preamble of the directive.
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policies in developing countries. However in the annual report, due by 19 June 
2013, there is no obligation to include impact assessments on brain drain nor to 
provide possible counteracting measures. The calls for more compulsory mea-
sures102 were not followed up and resulted in impoverished provisions in the Blue 
Card Directive.
Despite the Commission’s referral to the need of both skilled and unskilled,103 
up until now no final legislation to facilitate mobility for this last category has 
been adopted. In conformity with the Policy Plan on Legal Migration one pro-
posal intended for low(er) skilled workers, namely seasonal workers, and another 
for non-EU skilled workers of multinational concerns, namely intra-corporate 
transferees (ICT), have been tabled, but have not been poured into a final version 
yet.104 The proposal for seasonal workers is directed at a specific category of sea-
sonal temporary migrants. The directive would also allow the removal of obstacles 
to legal migration for non- and low skilled workers.105 It is intended to contribute 
to the effective management of migration flows.106 The eligibility criterion that 
defines a seasonal worker is based on “the passing of the season”; the activity is 
tied to a certain time of the year by an event or pattern during which labour levels 
rise far above the usual.107 Agriculture and tourism are the sectors most com-
monly referred to,108 but nothing is excluding the possible application on other 
sectors and it is up to the Member States to fill in these criteria. On the one hand, 
the directive would remain limited to a certain category of legal migrants. On the 
other hand, the definition however does not contain elements concerning the 
non- or low skilled aspect. It is assessed that young and educated third country 
nationals often migrate and as a consequence this might imply the risk of a tem-
porary brain drain.109 In addition, when no alternative is present, this might result 
in ‘brain waste’. The goal of the directive is not only to pro tect a weaker category 
of workers, a sector that is characterized by illegal em ploy ment and most vulner-
102) COM(2008)177 and SEC(2008)434/2; SEC(2008)2476.
103) The need not only for (highly) skilled, but also for lower and unskilled was also brought to the atten-
tion by the Committee of the Regions (OJ C 257/20 of 9 October 2008), point 53 and the EESC 
(SOC/300), point 1.3 and opinion of the EESC on ‘EU immigration and cooperation policy with coun-
tries of origin to foster development’, OJ 44/91 of 16 February 2008, points 10.1 and 10.3.
104) http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/forward_programming_2010.pdf. These measures 
will be taken based on the new Lisbon rules of c-decision and qualified majority.
105) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal employment, COM(2010)379, 
13.07.2010, 2 and 6.
106) Consideration 6 of the proposal (COM(2010)379, 14) and Commission Staff Working Document, 
Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal 
employment, SEC(2010)887, 13.07.2010, 18.
107) Art. 3 (b) and (c) of the proposal.
108) E.g. consideration 10 in the preamble of the proposal.
109) SEC(2010)887, 26.
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able for exploitation and bad working conditions,110 but it is also aimed at con-
tributing to the development of the country of origin, addressing the central goal 
of poverty alleviation and the attainment of the MDG, thereby complying with 
the EU development policy.111 It is expected to realize this objective by ensuring 
flexible rules that guarantee temporary legal migration, and as such no major 
brain drain issues are likely to occur, and by promoting circular migration facili-
tating reliable inflows of remittances and transfer of skills and investment.112 
Although the proposal does not state a maximum duration of work permit per 
stay, the provisions in Article 11, setting the maximum at six months per calendar 
year (paragraph 1), clearly indicate that it only concerns actual seasonal work and 
hence temporary migration. Several measures (incentives and safeguards) have 
been taken to avoid temporary migration becoming permanent.113 Article 11, 
paragraph 1 contains an obligation of return for the seasonal worker. The provi-
sion in paragraph 2 that allows for an extension of the contract, within the maxi-
mum period, and the possible change of employer was included to reduce the risk 
of overstaying and it is assessed that this will allow higher earnings and remit-
tances sent home, which contributes to the development of the country of ori-
gin.114 The measure to facilitate re-entry (Article 12) should be an additional 
incentive to return to the country of origin (infra). A safeguard to ensure that the 
migration is temporary, is the sanction foreseen in Article 12, paragraph 2 that 
the seasonal worker is to be excluded from admission for one or more years if he/
she does not comply with the obligations, in particular the obligation to return. 
In the same sense, an employer who has not ful filled the obligations arising out of 
the work contract, shall be excluded from appli cation for seasonal workers. This 
in combination with Directive 2009/52115 should be a disincentive for temporary 
migration becoming permanent.116 The suggestion of a reporting obligation upon 
return in the country of origin was discarded based on financial considerations 
and doubts on the feasibility of this solution.117 The circularity aspect is included 
through the facilitation for re-entry (consideration 17 and Article 12, paragraph 
1), by providing a multi-seasonal work permit or a facili tated procedure for sea-
sonal workers who were admitted to that Member State and apply to be admitted 
as such in a subsequent year. Making circularity dependent on compliance with 
110) SEC(2010)887, 13–14.
111) Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005)669, 3 and 7; SEC(2010)887, 17.
112) COM(2010)379, 3; SEC(2010)887, on the possible positive contributions for developing countries: 
pp. 24–25, 28–29, 30–34 and 34–39.
113) COM(2010)379, 2; SEC(2010)887, 11.
114) COM(2010)379, 10.
115) Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing 
for minimum standards and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, 
OJ L 168/24 of 30 June 2009.
116) Consideration 6 preamble of the proposal.
117) SEC(2010)887, 20, 30 and 39.
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the obligation of return (Article 12, paragraph 2) again demonstrates the securi-
tized vision of immigration.118 Moreover, it appears that the actual circularity and 
hence the contribution to the development of the country of origin is again in the 
hands of the Member States.119 It appears that the safeguards for return are stron-
ger than the possibility of circularity. These measures seem yet another ex ample of 
failed circularity. In the analysis above, it is demonstrated that the proposal at 
least suffers from a few remaining flaws. However, it is too early to draw conclu-
sions and a lot will depend on the final version of the directive, as well as on the 
implementation in practice. It must nonetheless be mentioned that in referring to 
the commitment of the Union towards the legal options for labour migration, 
reference is again made to the requirement of a strong(er) commitment from the 
countries of origin in tackling irregular migration.120
In comparison, the proposal for a directive for intra-corporate transfers is 
directed at highly skilled and qualified third country nationals. In relation to the 
GATS, in particular mode 4 (infra, section 4.2), the directive is presented as a 
complement to the international commitments, as the GATS does not contain 
provisions on entry, stay and residence.121 The facilitation of intra-corporate 
transfers is described as an objective, which is also shared by EU trade policy. The 
existing difference between the Member States in entry procedures and tempo-
rary residence rights is considered an obstacle for the uniform application of the 
international commitments.122 Hence, the provisions in the (proposal) directive 
facilitate the fulfilment of the international commitments under the GATS, as 
well as commitments in agreements such as the EPA with the CARIFORUM 
States.123 As a consequence, the definitions in the pro po sal were aligned with 
the ones used under the GATS.124 Logically, the definitions of the targeted cate-
gories, namely managers, specialists and also graduate trainees (Article 3), in gen-
eral concur with the definition of ‘key personnel’ used in the EPA with the 
118) See note 28, CEPS Working Document, N° 321, October 2009, p. 15.
119) Certainly in combination with the possible grounds of refusal in Article 6 (economic needs test, 
quota, EU preference). 
120) COM(2010)379, 6; SEC(2010)887, 14 and 16.
121) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, COM(2010)378, 
13.07.2010, 2–4 and 14 (recital 10 preamble); Commission Staff Working Docu ment, Impact Assess-
ment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on condi-
tions of entry and residence of third country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, 
SEC(2010)884, 13.07.2010, 20–21.
122) COM(2010)378, 7; SEC(2010)884, 17 and 19.
123) COM(2010)378, 2–4 and 14 (recital 10 preamble); SEC(2010)884, 20–21. This also means that the 
directive does not contain a right of admission and the Member States remain competent to determine 
the volumes of admission, but this must be used in accordance with the commitments resulting from 
international agreements facilitating the entry and temporary stay of certain categories of trade- and 
investment-related natural persons, COM(2010)378, 10.
124) SEC(2010)884, 6 and 8 and 21.
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CARIFORUM States (Article 81).125 In general, the scope of the directive is 
broader, in the sense that also intra-corporate transfers in the non-service sector 
as well as from third countries, who are not party to a trade agreement, are 
targeted.126 This proposal is directed at a special category of migrants, being third 
country nationals who are still employees of their country of origin, who fulfil an 
assignment for a defined period of time in order to address specific short term 
needs of the company.127 Hence, they can be considered temporary migrants 
in principle. The temporary nature is guaranteed by the required proof of evidence 
that the transferee will be able to transfer back to an entity belonging to that 
group of undertakings and established in a third country at the end of the assign-
ment (recital 13 preamble and Article 5, paragraph 1 (b)). Secondly, the granted 
permit is limited to a maximum of three years for managers and specialists and 
one year for graduate trainees (Article 11, paragraph 2), as is the case in the EPA 
CARIFORUM (Article 81, paragraph 1).128 It is assessed that in general most 
ICT come from developed or emerging countries and thus the brain drain impli-
cations are not considered to be a major issue.129 In addition, as the migration is 
only temporary, a possible brain drain from developing countries is limited in 
time. Moreover, the directive is considered beneficial to the country of origin 
due to transfers of skills, knowledge, technology and know-how and encourages 
brain circulation.130 Notwithstanding the fact that the impact on developing 
countries is considered to be limited, it may at least be considered that this direc-
tive, in combination with the Blue Card Directive (see also section 4.2.), might 
be a first step for permanent migration for the highly skilled/qualified.131 This 
possibility is also recognized in the Commission’s impact assess ment, referring to 
125) Only slight differences can be noticed. Such as the fact that the definition on intra-corporate transfers 
(Article 80 EPA CARIFORUM) contains a one year employment requirement before transfer as in the 
directive a 12 month criterion is included in the admission criteria of Article 5, paragraph 1 (b). Also in 
the definition on graduate trainees there is a small specification that the training should aim at preparing 
the transferee for a managerial position (compare Article 80 EPA CARIFROUM with Article 3 (g) of the 
proposal for a directive).
126) COM(2010)378, 9 and 14 (consideration 10 preamble). In general, because the broader scope of 
the directive does not hold for the EPA CARIFORUM. In that agreement the temporary presence of 
ICT is not necessarily linked to the supply of services. In comparison to the movement of contractual 
service suppliers and independent professionals, that is limited to the supply of specific services (Article 83). 
B. Hoekman and C. Özden, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Trade in Services as an Alter native to 
Migration”, JCMS, Vol. 48 No. 4 (2010), (835) 851 (857).
127) COM(2010)378, 2–3; SEC(2010)884, 6 and 14.
128) SEC(2010)884, 21.
129) It was also not identified as a problem by the stakeholders, SEC(2010)884, 98.
130) Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005)669, 8; COM(2010), 14 (consideration 7 preamble); 
SEC(2010)884, 14 and 35. In comparison to the proposal on seasonal workers, the contribution to the 
development of the third country is not incorporated as a main objective (compare SEC(2010)887, p. 17 
to SEC(2010)884, p. 20).
131) Although Article 3 (g) of the Blue Card Directive excludes ICT, the coordination between both direc-
tives is limited and the entry under this directive might facilitate the change in status under the latter 
directive and facilitate the acquirement of the long term resident status.
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the temporary nature that the “ICT should have to leave the EU territory, unless 
he/she is authorized to change status”.132 Hence, the abovementioned remark that 
the nature of this migration is temporary in principle. Although the explanatory 
memorandum refers to the different rationale of the Directive on Family Reuni-
fication, being an instrument to foster integration of third country nationals who 
could become permanent residents, and this directive only setting up an attrac-
tive scheme,133 it cannot be denied that the attractiveness of the scheme also bears 
on the possibility of staying in the host country. It is assessed that taking into 
account the provisions on family reunification in the ICT directive (Article 15),134 
there might be negative implications for circular migration. It is recognized that 
the transferee might not return home and acquire a permanent status, making the 
brain drain issue also a permanent reality.135 The two new proposals for directives 
might be an attempt to provide for a comprehensive immigration policy, but one 
can however, not avoid the impression that legal migration primarily remains a 
privilege of the highly qualified and skilled and that circularity remains an instru-
ment of which the potential has yet to be found.136
The positive evolution of the alignment of certain conditions for legal migra-
tion, however never leading to a general right of entrance/admission, is overshad-
owed by the lack of an actual comprehensive and coherent approach. It seems 
that these directives have paid little attention to the needs of the developing coun-
tries, longing for more legal mobility channels for skilled and lower or unskilled 
migrants, and at the same time guaranteeing minimal negative effects. True legal 
commitments towards the mitigation of brain drain are weak137 and it remains to 
be seen whether and how the Member States will use the provided options.138 
Moreover, the commitments towards ethical recruitment contain no obligations 
for the private sector employers and the Blue Card Directive is not applicable in 
the UK, Ireland and Denmark. In addition, guarantees of return and the issue of 
132) SEC(2010)884, 22.
133) COM(2010)378, 11.
134) These are, except for the possible access to the labour market and accumulation of periods of resi-
dence, the same as in the Blue Card Directive.
135) SEC(2010), 31 and 40.
136) It appears that the access to the Union is easier for the highly qualified, only just referring to the 
number of options available in comparison to the low or unskilled, and this also appears to be the case for 
staying in the Union. Just one example: in Article 7 of the proposal on ICT it is possible not to renew the 
ICT permit (Member States may) or hold the host entity responsible and provide for penalties (Article 8) 
if the conditions of admission are not complied with. In the conditions of admission a proof of evidence 
of possible return to the country origin is required (Article 5). This implies that a return is expected of the 
ICT, but it does not necessarily lead to the impossibility to apply and receive a renewal. This in compari-
son to Article 12 of the proposal for seasonal workers, where the facilitation of re-entry is made strictly 
dependent on the obligation to return home. 
137) S. Peers, “Legislative Update: EC Immigration and Asylum Law Attracting and Deterring Labour 
Migration: The Blue Card and Employers Sanctions Directives”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 
Issue 11 (2009), pp. (387) 407 and 409 (426).
138) The transposition deadline for the Blue Card Directive being 19 June 2011.
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circularity are only taken into consideration where it is in the interest of the 
Member State. In sum, the desires of the Member States are addressed, but leave 
the needs of developing countries high and dry.
Considering the growing increase of remittances into and their impact on 
developing countries, this issue cannot be left out completely from the analysis.139 
It can be argued that a certain degree of compensation for the loss of human 
capital could be found through the transfer of remittances by the third country 
nationals.140 However, as has been demonstrated, some provisions, mainly for the 
highly qualified, stimulate a more permanent form of migration. Hence, an 
increase of this kind of migration might result in a decrease of remittances.141 In 
addition, the possibility that these migrants will stay in the Union, can result into 
fiscal losses, as they will no longer pay taxes in the country of origin.142 It is sug-
gested that in the case of actual temporary migration, this might generate signifi-
cant remittance flows, as the link with the family members remains strong.143 
However, this assumption will also depend on the migrants and their ties in the 
country of origin. In the case of younger migrants, it is possible that there are no 
or less extended families to take care of and the earnings will be used for own 
consumption or investment in the human capital of the migrant.144 The latter 
could be an asset for the country of origin in case of actual return.145 The trans-
ferred money will, in the first place, serve the family or community in the country 
of origin. Using the transferred money for consumption can have a positive 
impact on the local economies in the country of origin and addresses the 
most direct need of poverty alleviation at home.146 Also taking into account more 
long-term development issues, however, and the private nature of these assets, 
there is no guarantee that the remittances are used for more development oriented 
139) For data on the level of worker remittances: the IMF keeps annual records on the amount of official 
worker remittance flows (Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook). R.H. Adams, International Migration, 
Remittances and the Brain Drain. A Study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries, The World Bank, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Network, Poverty Reduction Group, June 2003, 36 pp.; S. Gupta, 
C. Pattillo and S. Wagh, Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, IMF Working Paper, WP/07/38, February 2007, pp. 1–6 (43).
140) Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, ibid., 43 pp. 
141) Niessen, supra note 13, pp. (483) 496 (496); K. Mensah, M. Mackintosh and L. Henry, The ‘Skills 
Drain’ of Health Professionals from the Developing World: a Framework for Policy Formulation, Medact, 
February 2005, pp. 28–33 (50).
142) Y. Kerem Gümüs, “EU Blue Card Scheme: The Right Step in the Right Direction?”, European Jour-
nal of Migration and Law, Issue 12 (2010), pp. (435) 444 (453).
143) E.g. Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal employment, SEC(2010)887, 13.07.2010, 24–25, 
28–29 and 39. 
144) Hoekman and Özden, supra note 126, pp. (835) 845 (857).
145) Niessen, supra note 13, pp. (483) 496 (496).
146) Regarding the poverty reduction effect of remittances, see: Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, supra note 139, 
11–16 (43). Regarding the impact on financial development, see: Ibid., pp. 16–21 (43).
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investments, such as healthcare and education, nor is there a certainty that it will 
contribute to more sustainable economic management. The challenge is to open 
opportunities for those who wish to use (part of ) the remittances for any form of 
investment supporting development.147
The correlation between legal migration and remittances, contributing to the 
development of the country of origin, will depend on a number of factors, such 
as the strength of the connection that remains with the country of origin, the 
knowledge regarding and the facilities available to transfer money to the country 
of origin, the use of the remittances by the recipient household, as well as the 
mechanisms in place to stimulate an input of these remittances into the develop-
ment of the country of origin. There could be a role for remittances in reducing 
poverty and stimulating growth in the country of origin, but as is the case for 
legal migration, a lot remains to be done for development-enhancing remittan-
ces.148 Nevertheless, the possible positive contribution of remittances will (prob-
ably) not compensate fully for the loss of human capital in the developing country, 
especially in the case of the highly skilled, whose skills are much-needed in sectors 
like healthcare and the loss makes it harder to advance their innovative capital as 
a crucial driver of long-term growth.149
3.1. Mobility Partnerships as the Tool for the Future?
Mobility packages, as first suggested in 2006, were intended to become the instru-
ment of the Global Approach. After the identification in December 2007 of 
147) COM(2005)390, p. 20.
148) Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, supra note 139, 21–25 (43). Suggestions in the Communication on “Inte-
grating Migration Issues in the European Union’s relations with Third Countries”, 03.12.2002, 
COM(2002)703, pp. 14–15: securing cheap, legal, secure and transparent mechanisms for transfer of 
remittances and by stimulating, the transfers, or a part, to be used to the benefit of the development of 
the developing country. For national examples, see: Ministerie van Buiten landse Zaken, Voortgangsrap-
portage Internationale Migratie en Ontwikkeling 2008, Kamerbrief 26 januari 2010 (http://www.nieuws-
bank.nl/inp/2010/01/26/R355.htm). The continued request for more development oriented measures: 
COM(2005)390, Annex 2 and 3, pp. 15–22; Communication on “Strengthening the Global Approach 
to Migration: Increasing coordination, coherence and synergies”, 08.09.2008, COM(2008)611, pp. 
6–10; 2914th General Affairs Council meeting, Council Conclusions of the Global Approach to Migra-
tion and on the partnerships with countries of origin and transit, 8 December 2008, p. 5; Note from the 
Presidency to the General Affairs Council and European Council, “The Stockholm Programme – An 
open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens”, 2 December 2009, p. 62. A concrete project 
so that remittances can better serve the development of the receiving countries is the set up of an African 
Remittances Institute. The preparatory phase started in 2010 and the aim is to facilitate better, more 
effective and safer remittances’ transfer systems, which will fully take into account the specificities of the 
African countries. The first meeting of the steering committee in June 2010 marks the beginning of the 
implementation of the project, so it remains to be seen if this new project can serve as a development tool 
for poverty reduction. (Report of the 11th Meeting of the Joint AUC-EC Task Force, 20–21 October 
2010, Addis Ababa, 43; http://www.afrique avenir.org/en/2010/06/10/au-eu-launch-3-million-euro-
migration-project/).
149) Kerem Gümüs, supra note 142, pp. (435) 444 (453).
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countries eligible for pilot projects, in particular Moldova and Cape Verde,150 the 
established principles in the communication on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships were put into practice. The mobility partnership with Cape Verde 
seems to be a further illustration of a point already made.151 This partnership is 
politically framed into the Global Approach and legally within the existing coop-
eration frameworks, in particular the Cotonou agreement and the EU-Cape 
Verde Special Partnership.152 The choice for Cape Verde as pilot project seems 
logic, considering that the country belongs to the ACP Group of States and the 
EU-Africa Summit in December 2007 (infra), the Special Partnership, the evolu-
tion from a least developed country to a middle-income country. Yet it seems the 
emergence of West Africa as a major route for irregular migration, and their role 
in cooperation on illegal migration issues were decisive in making this choice.
The partnership, signed on 5 June 2008,153 is based on a joint declaration, 
in clud ing the Community, Cape Verde and the five Member States154 willing to 
‘conclude’ such a partnership. The voluntary character, with no legal framework 
and without a common approach can be considered as a first weakness, mainly at 
the disadvantage of the developing country. This was explained as being necessary 
in the view of flexibility and the need for differentiation anticipating the needs of 
the partner country. This approach on the legal nature is the reflection of pru-
dence towards the division of competences concerning the internal as well as the 
external dimension of labour immigration policy. However, this ‘soft law’ basis 
can provide problems of coordination, leaving much in the hands of the Member 
States and offering no instrument to enforce promises made.155
The commitments of the parties seem unbalanced. The partnership in general 
provides for intensified cooperation and dialogue on the three thematic issues 
of the Global Approach. In the annex, some proposed activities were included. 
The offers of the Member States, concerning legal migration, contain issues on 
sufficient supply of information on legal migration, but also some actual efforts156 
are made to facilitate legal circular migration for some categories of migrants and 
150) Negotiations were started also with Senegal, but several obstructions have halted the process. See: 
M-H Chou, From Cotonou to Circular Migration: the EU, Senegal and the ‘Agreement Duplicity, First draft 
paper for ‘Migration: A World in Motion’, Maastricht, the Netherlands, 18–20 February 2010.
151) Addendum “I/A” Item Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent Repre-
sentatives Committee/Council, “Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European 
Union and the Republic of Cape Verde”, 21 May 2008.
152) Communication “On the future of relations between the European Union and the Republic of Cape 
Verde”, 24.09.2007, COM(2007)641. Adopted in the 2830the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 19 November 2007.
153) Signature of a joint declaration on a mobility partnership between the European Union and Cape 
Verde, 10302/08 (Presse160), 5 June 2008. 
154) Initially only Spain, France, Luxemburg and Portugal took part, later the Netherlands joined in 
2008.
155) See note 28, CEPS Working Document, N° 321, October 2009, p. 29.
156) Joint Communiqué, II EU-Cape Verde Ministerial Troika Meeting, 9661/09 (Presse 122), 7 May 2009.
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to facilitate the exchange of students and teaching staff. The proposal for easier 
mobility through visa facilitation, almost the only Union undertaking, is still in 
the pipeline.157 The possibility to include measures to address the risk of brain 
drain, was translated e.g. into proposals for circular migration of highly qualified 
professionals and the support for Cape Verdean national health systems. These are 
however mainly proposals waiting to be implemented and for a large part depen-
dent on the good will of the Member States. The offer of legal migration oppor-
tunities will thus depend on the (labour market) needs of the individual Member 
State and present little or no guarantees for new mobility opportunities and 
contributions on the development front. The issues on illegal migration and asy-
lum seem to be formulated in a more compulsory manner for Cape Verde. The 
commitments on illegal migration and effective mechanism for readmission, 
being eligibility criteria, explain partly the choice for Cape Verde, as the commit-
ment towards readmission is already present in Article 13 of the Cotonou Con-
vention.158 The implementation of commitments made by the Member States 
and the Union is made conditional on Cape Verde entering into the binding 
commitments on illegal migration, in other words possible mobility as a “reward” 
for compliance.159
The mobility partnership does not fully comply with the EU commitment 
towards a truly comprehensive and balanced migration policy and the idea of 
‘partnership’ can be equally doubted. The mobility partnership seems, taking into 
account the lack of an actual balance in legal commitments and a true common 
approach, just a first step and an opportunity that comes with many challenges.
Despite the fact that it was still too early to analyze the mobility partnership 
with Cape Verde, the Commission further pushed forward the mobility partner-
ships as the most promising tool for the Global Approach.160 The same line of 
reasoning, as being non-binding in nature and providing a framework for bilat-
eral agreements between the third country and a Member State, was kept. Hence, 
the possibility that they actually evolve to more compulsory commitments for 
both parties does not seem realistic. The identification of future partners was 
suggested to be based more on strategic interest in the long term, but the coun-
try’s capacity to implement and of course its willingness to cooperate on the ille-
gal migration front, as well as the inter ests of the Member States, were kept as 
157) 2009/JLS/036 Draft Council Decision on the signature and conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Community and Cape Verde on the facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas: Subject to a 
successful outcome of the negotiations, to propose to the Council to conclude and sign the agreement in 
accordance with Article 218 TFEU.
158) Negotiations have started on both a visa facilitation agreement and a readmission agreement 
(EU-Cape Verde Political Dialogue Meeting at Ministerial level, 5796/10 (Presse10), 26 January 2010.
159) Triandafyllidou, supra note 44.
160) Commission Staff Working Document – Mobility Partnerships as a tool the Global Approach to 
Migration, 21.09.2009, SEC(2009)1240.
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prerequisites.161 The actual comprehensive and balanced approach of these part-
nerships will most likely depend on the wil lingness and needs of the Member 
States and the power of the third country in ques tion. The lack of a common, 
Union approach might also undermine the importance of coherence and coordi-
nation. Therefore, these mobility partnerships do not provide for much legal cer-
tainty and guarantees for an equality between legal migration, illegal migration 
and the positive migration-development nexus and between the partners. The 
challenge for the future is thus avoiding the evolution into an instru ment in the 
hands of the Member States only in their national interests.162
4. The EU-ACP Relationship: A Model for Change or More of the Same?
It is wondered whether and how these evolutions have found their place in this 
specific relationship, considering that Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Carib-
bean and Pacific regions are extremely vulnerable to immigration and the conse-
quences of the exodus of skilled workers. Unfortunately, the EPAs are a mere 
expression of the fact that a comprehensive migration-development-trade policy 
is also lacking here.
4.1. Migration Issues in the General EU-ACP Framework
The relationship with the African continent, and later the ACP, has always been 
at the forefront of the EU external relations. This relationship has been character-
ized by the focus on trade (in goods) and development cooperation. As the exter-
nal dimension on migration emerged in general policy documents in parallel, it 
has surfaced in the relationship with the ACP. This is somewhat logic considering 
the fact that the ACP, in particular the African continent, has been identified 
quite early as a priority area.
The joint declaration in Lomé II163 only provided for measures for legally resid-
ing workers (Annex XV). In Lomé III164 an additional declaration was annexed to 
en hance the rights for legally migrating workers (Annex IX). The admission for 
stu dents was left to the bilateral framework. The Annex did provide for possible 
sup port, both for training of migrating workers who return and the education of 
ACP stu dents aimed at vocational integration in their country of origin. It was 
furthermore added that the ACP countries should take the necessary measures 
161) COM(2008)611; SEC(2009)1240; Council Conclusions on Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the 
Global Approach to Migration, 2979th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, 30 November 
2009.
162) See note 28, CEPS Working Document, N° 321, October 2009, p. 32.
163) OJ L 347/1 of 22.12.1980.
164) OJ L 86/1 of 31.03.1986.
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with regard to ille gal migration. Lomé IV165 only completes the picture by adding 
non discrimina tion for workers, students and other foreign nationals (Article 5, 
paragraph 4) into the main text of the Convention. The provisions are thus, not 
illogic considering the time frame, scarce with regard to immigration and con-
tained no provisions on mobili ty or admission.
The further development in the Cotonou Convention166 and the Cairo Decla-
ration167 fits perfectly into the standard policy guidelines. The partnership agree-
ment incorporates migration in the political dialogue (Article 8, paragraph 3). 
Moreover a separate migration clause was included in Article 13. This includes the 
specific in-depth dialogue concerning migration and consolidates the former dec-
larations on non discrimination, on tackling the root causes of migration, on 
support for training geared at vocational integration of ACP nationals in their 
countries of origin and on cooperation to facilitate access of ACP students to 
education. Furthermore, specific paragraphs were added to include illegal migra-
tion issues into the political dialogue (paragraph 5) and, in line with attention for 
illegal migration and the later Seville Council,168 a readmission clause169 was pro-
vided for.170 The need for action to re verse brain drain, called for in the Cairo Plan 
of Action, was reflected in a specific brain drain clause in the technical coopera-
tion framework (Article 80). This is how ever limited to possible support of the 
Community, upon ACP request, to facilitate the return of qualified ACP nation-
als through re-installation incentives. The development-migration connection is 
present, but still based on an approach looking at the problems of poor develop-
ment in the country of origin171 and illegal migration, and was not taken on from 
the possible contribution of migration to development point of view. Despite the 
shift, at least theoretically, to a more balanced and com prehensive approach, this 
was not addressed in the first revision of the Cotonou Con vention.172 The con-
cerns of the ACP regarding evolutions in the EU vision on mo bility, brain drain 
and the link with illegal immigration, increased as expressed in the Nadi Declara-
tion173 and they requested for better cooperation.
165) OJ L 229/1 of 17.08.1991and OJ L 156/1 of 29.05.1998.
166) OJ L 317/3 of 15.12.2000.
167) Africa-EU Summit, under the Aegis of OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3/4 April 2000, Conseil/00/901 and 
107/4/00 REV 4.
168) Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 20 and 21 June 2002.
169) The Parties agree to accept return and readmission upon request and without further formalities. It 
further provides for negotiations on readmission agreements for implementation in practice. 
170) Article 13 was considered to be a model for negotiation in future agreements with third countries 
(COM(2002)703).
171) The incorporation in Country and Regional Strategy papers was also mainly addressed from the 
impact of development on migration and not of the possible stimulus migration might provide for 
development.
172) OJ L 209/26 of 11.08.2005.
173) 3rd Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government, Denarau, Nadi-Fiji Islands , 18/19 June 2002, 
Nadi Declaration, ACP Solidarity in a Globalised World.
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The increased attention for migration was also reflected by initiatives on the 
‘internal’ African front, with an important role for the African Union (AU) and 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This attention for migra-
tion con sists of several measures, such as the 1991 Abuja Treaty striving for free 
move ment of persons in the framework of an African Economic Community, the 
NEPAD Human Resources Development Programme, the NEPAD Health 
Strategy,174 the Ouagadougou Declaration on employment and poverty allevia-
tion, the Nyerere pro gramme for students. A non binding migration policy frame-
work for Africa was adopted in 2006 in the framework of the AU, serving as a 
guide for national migra tion policies.175 From these documents, it appears that 
migration is mainly addressed from the possible positive effects on migration, 
while mitigating the negative. Re gardless of the fact that an important responsibil-
ity belongs to the developing coun tries themselves, the set goals can however not 
be reached without cooperation and commitments from both parties.
Although the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa176 does mention the possible posi-
tive contribution of migration for development, the focus still seemed to be on 
tackling illegal migration and migration or exchange of students (Erasmus Mun-
dus), teachers and researchers and the root causes of migration. Still, the general 
legal migration issue and brain drain problem are only scarcely touched upon.177 
Slowly, but surely, the importance of Africa in an enhanced dialogue and coop-
eration on all fronts was endorsed178 and eventually consolidated into the Global 
Approach. The consolidation and strengthening of the dialogue was further pur-
sued, which resulted in the Rabat conference at regional level. The Euro-African 
Partnership for Migra tion and Development concentrated on managing specific 
migration flows along the Western African route. The better use of legal migra-
tion and movement of people were enumerated as relevant issues. The Tripoli 
Declaration (2006) was the first joint approach on migration and development 
between the EU and the entire African continent. It is a political commitment on 
both sides to cooperate on the overall mi gration front, including human resources, 
brain drain and regular migration oppor tu nities, referring e.g. to circular migration 
and recruitment policies. The Rabat follow up in Paris (2008) fully includes the 
evolution towards the Global Approach and con firms made political commit-
ments. It is clear that since 2006 migration has evolved to one of the key topics 
174) http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/115.pdf. 
175) Executive Council, Ninth ordinary session, 25–29 June 2006, Banjul, the Gambia, “The Migration 
Policy Framework for Africa”.
176) Communication on an “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
development”, 12.10.2005, COM(2005)89.
177) “EU Strategy: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership” (doc. 15702/1/05) endorsed at 
the European Council meeting, December 15/16 December 2005.
178) COM(2002)703; Council conclusions on Migration and External Relations, 2691st External Rela-
tions Council meeting, 21 November 2005.
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in the EU-Africa dialogue.179 This was in conformity with the general evolutions 
encompassing all three aspects of the Global Approach, but also demonstrated 
the need for concrete action and the resistance towards mobility for all migrant 
categories.180 The Commission explicitly stated that the priorities had been set, 
but the real test, in particular for Africa, was still to come.181
The integration of migration into dialogue at continental, regional, and bilat-
eral level could only lead to migration being one of the priority areas in the Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) established at the 2nd EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon 
(2007).182 Migration and development was included into the strategy aimed at 
accelerating progress towards the MDG. The 7th Partnership on Migration, 
Development and Employment in the First Action Plan (2008–2010) is consid-
ered to be a consolidation of the longer term migration and development agenda 
taken forward with Africa to date,183 identifying amongst others the implementa-
tion of the Tripoli Declaration as a priority. It is not surprising that the mobility 
side is focusing on circular migration. In the promotion of dialogue and coopera-
tion regarding visa to facilitate mobility, the officials involved on a regular basis in 
the EU-Africa partnership, are identified as a priority area and thus appear to 
limit the options for a broader visa facilitation. Other measures identified are 
enhancing education and vocational training, as well as enhancing the implemen-
tation of measures to tackle shortages of health workers in developing countries,184 
promotion of ethical recruitment and creating incentives for the retention and 
return of key qualified personnel, only repeating general calls and the commit-
ment of Article 80 Cotonou. From a general analysis, it appears that the occasion 
to counterbalance the desire of the EU on stronger commitments of Africa con-
cerning illegal migration, with equally strong commitments on more legal migra-
tion options and actual brain drain measures, was not grasped. In addition, only 
about half of the Member States and about 8 ACP countries are engaged in the 
7th Partnership.185
The tools of the Global Approach were applied intensively. This concerns, e.g. 
the EU migration missions to guarantee and support the integration of migration 
179) T. van Criekinge, “The Integration of Migration Issues in EPAs”, in G. Faber and J. Orbie, Beyond 
Market Access for Economic Development. EU-Africa Relations in Transition, London: Routledge 2009, 
pp. (173) 180–183.
180) E.g. Note from Council to European Council, “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. 
The Way Forward and Key Achievements in 2006”, 11 December 2006; Communication “From Cairo 
to Lisbon. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership”, 27 June 2007, COM(2007) 357.
181) COM(2007)1632.
182) Commission/Council Secretariat Joint Paper, “Beyond Lisbon. Making the EU-Africa Strategic Part-
nership work”, 27.06.2007, SEC(2007) 856; Lisbon Declaration – EU Africa Summit, Lisbon, 8/9 
December 2007, 16343/07 (Presse 290). 
183) COM(2007)780.
184) Also included in the Partnership on the MDG.
185) Joint Progress report in the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan; 
http://europafrica.net/jointstrategy/migration/. 
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in the political dialogue, the development cooperation platforms, the establish-
ment of migration management centres, the incorporation of migration profiles 
into the Coun try Strategy Papers, a mobility partnership, the support for coop-
eration through the AENEAS Programme and later the thematic programme 
‘Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum’, the sup-
port through the EDF,186 Erasmus Mundus, Edulink, the Centre for Migration 
Information and Management (CIGEM) in Mali, etc. The latter, as well as a lot 
of the other measures, was officially established to not only curb illegal migration, 
but also to help those who want to migrate legally. Critics however suggest this is 
nothing more than a watch dog for the EU.187 The actual result of these initiatives 
is hard to measure and some of them seem to answer the EU concerns rather than 
the positive migration contri bution for development. It cannot be denied that 
substantial efforts and some achieve ments, e.g. intensification of the dialogue on 
migration, have been made during the past few years. Nevertheless, the follow up 
of the Lisbon Summit demon strates that the focus seems to be on these general 
measures, in particular for data gathering and analysis, the importance of remit-
tances and cooperation on illegal migration, offering little concrete implementa-
tion measures for a broader legal mobility framework nor addressing the brain 
drain issue.188 The adopted roadmap189 and midterm review,190 referring only to 
the mobility partnership with Cape Verde with regard to mobility, proves the 
limitations of the Union binding offers on legal migration and brain drain and 
the fact that it remains in the hands, and thus also the good will, of the Member 
States for actual measures. This increases the risk to be used only in their own 
interest and also brings forward the question of a long-term common ‘develop-
ment’ vision on circular migration.191
The proposals of the Commission on how to consolidate and further evolve the 
Strategic Partnership192 (JAES), preceding the 3rd EU-Africa Summit, as well as 
186) Although critics have pointed out the aid development was too much conditioned upon the fulfill-
ment of commitments on illegal migration. 
187) “EU opens migration centre in Mali, ‘Outpost watchtower of Fortress Europe’ ”, http://www. mo.be. 
188) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “One year after 
Lisbon: The Africa-EU Partnership at Work”, 17.10.2008, COM(2008)617 and SEC(2008)2603; Joint 
Communiqué 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, Addis Ababa, 20/11 November 2008, 
16189/08(Presse 341). Joint Progress report in the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and 
its first Action Plan.
189) 12th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting, Luxembourg, 28 April 2009, 7472/09(Presse 60), Road-
map October 2009.
190) 13th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting, Addis Ababa, 14 October 2009, 14504/09(Presse 292). 
Assessment report (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JFT).
191) IOM – Unitar, “Africa-EU 7th Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment: Moving for-
ward involving Non-State Actors”, 4 June 2009, Brussels.
192) Communication on “The consolidation of EU Africa relations. 1.5 Billion people, 80 countries, two 
continents, one future”, 10.11.2010, COM(2010)634, 5–6. Reference is made, in the framework of 
inclusive growth, to the need for high-employment economies. In that same framework also cooperation 
on migration and mobility is included, again referring to circular migration as means for legal migration 
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the list of achievements on the eight thematic partnerships,193 are poor in regard 
to legal migration and the brain drain issue. It is clear that migration is a difficult 
and highly sensitive subject that needs further discussion. Hence, it is no surprise 
that in the overreaching theme of “Growth, Job Creation and Investment” of the 
3rd Summit, migration was a hot topic.194 The overreaching theme was broken 
down into sub-themes, amongst which ‘Migration, Mobility and Job Creation’. 
The note in the overview of the Partnership on Migration Mobility and Employ-
ment in the 2nd Action Plan (2011–2013) of the JAES, on the intensification of 
dialogue and co-operation, the uneven scattered results, the reliance on political 
interests, difficulties regarding institutional capacities as well as competence issues 
regarding migration and employment policies, confirm the difficulties surround-
ing the migration debate.195 Valuable initiatives have been taken and the intro-
ductory note of the 2nd Action Plan stresses the need to facilitate mobility and 
better manage legal migration and enhance the development impact of migra-
tion, thus confirming the commitment of making migration and mobility work 
for development.196 This was translated in the general objective of the Partnership 
through the inclusion of topics such as ‘diasporas, remittances, brain drain, regu-
lar migration, including circular migration, mobility and visa issues’ into the dia-
logue.197 However, the list of specific initiatives and activities is disappointing on 
this issue.198 Amongst others, the facilitation of dialogue and the creation of the 
ACP Observatory on Migration was included. The aim is to collect reliable and 
harmonized data on migration to be able to establish better policies to enhance 
“in direct connection with the labour market requirements and employment opportunities in both con-
tinents”. The aim of reducing illegal migration is also included. No mention is made on the brain drain 
problem, nor an explicit referral to attain to objective of making migration work for development was 
incorporated.
193) Key deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 01/06/2010, 6; 3rd Africa EU-Summit 29/30 
November, Tripoli, 24 November 2010, MEMO/10/604, 15–16. In general containing an enumeration 
of the abovementioned tools of the Global Approach. In the declaration following the meeting of the 
parliamentarians representing the Pan-African and European Parliaments reference is only made to 
addressing the root causes of (illegal) migration and, through creating prosperity and employment, and 
the commitment to limiting the harmful effects of brain drain. In addition, not a word creating channels 
for legal migration that also foster the development of the country of origin. (EP-PAP Parliamentary Pre-
Summit, Declaration for the Third Africa-Europe Summit, Tripoli, 27 November 2010. 
194) 3rd Africa EU-Summit: Team up for more “Investment, Economic Growth and Job Creation”, 
25 November 2010, IP/10/1605.
195) Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013, Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employ-
ment, p. 61.
196) Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013, Introductory Note, p. 6.
197) Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013,Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employ-
ment, p. 62.
198) Maybe the specific mention of the mobility of students and academics, in the introductory note, as 
well as the reference to facilitate mobility for commercial, professional and study reasons, was already a signal 
that concrete initiatives on mobility for broader categories of migrants would be limited.
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the migration contribution to development.199 It remains to be seen if this objec-
tive will be delivered and if such a data collection is not only to be used to the 
benefit of the Union. It appears that creating the right conditions in Africa for 
more and better jobs was stressed, thereby enhancing employment at home200 and 
contributing to development, but this was also seen as a manner to tackle some 
of the causes of (illegal) migration, and again the issue of illegal and irregular 
migration was emphasized.201 The question of mobility and (additional) legal 
migration channels was only scarcely touched upon through the inclusion in the 
dialogue and barely any mention was made of the brain drain problem.202 The 
inclusion into the dialogue of regular migration and brain drain is a recognition 
of the importance of these issues, but this inclusions and the absence of concrete 
initiatives are also an indication that a lot remains to be done.
It was only later that the Caribbean region emerged into the migration debate. 
In the EU Caribbean Partnership203 unemployment, migration and brain drain 
are identified as challenges. However in reversing them to opportunities nothing 
points out the possibilities of legal migration and concrete measures for the brain 
drain problem. Furthermore, mentioning the support for the health systems and 
education and the role of Cuba in counterbalancing the brain drain problem, 
only the problem of an active recruitment policy of the US was included. The first 
steps towards the commitment in the Lima declaration of May 2008204 for a 
structured and compre hensive dialogue on migration, was taken in June 2009 
through the launching of a Structured Dialogue on Migration.205 The dialogue 
should include the link between migration and development and regular mig-
ration. The integration of migration in this relation is still in its infancy. This 
is clearly shown in the Commission’s com munication206 in preparation for the 
EU-LAC Summit and the Madrid Declaration207 and the Madrid Action Plan 
199) Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013, Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employ-
ment, 63–65.
200) Tripoli Declaration, 3rd Africa EU Summit, 29/30 November 2010; Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action 
Plan 2011–2013, Introductory Note, 6 (point 24).
201) Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013, Introductory Note, 6.
202) Only in the framework of the overall objective it was stated that “in direct relation to strategies on 
employment, mobility and the harnessing of brain drain the parties will extend their dialogue to the area 
of higher education”.
203) Communication on “An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth Stability and Development”, 
02.03.2006, COM(2006)86.
204) Latin America and Caribbean-European Union Summit, Lima, May 16 2008, Lima declaration 
“Addressing our Peoples’ Priorities together”.
205) Launch of the EU-LAC Structured Dialogue on Migration, 30 June 2009 11577/09 (Presse 201) 
based on the joint document “Basis for Structuring the EU-LAC Dialogue on Migration”.
206) Communication on “The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership”, 
30.09.2009, COM(2009)495.
207) European Union – Latin America and Caribbean Summit, Madrid Declaration “Towards a new stage 
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(2010–2012)208 following this summit. These documents confirm the clear 
emphasis and increased importance of the migration issues, but remain limited in 
repeating the importance of the Structured Dialogue on Migration as a building 
block and the general view on the need for a strong dialogue and co-operation in 
line with the Global Approach to Migration. The Action Plan includes the need 
to strengthen the positive link between migration and development, but contains 
nothing on measures to enhance mobility or to address the brain drain problem. 
The inclusion of the migration issues seems to be more dictated (again) by the fear 
of growing migration flows from these areas than development concerns re garding 
the possible positive contribution of migration. The specific EU-CARIFORUM 
Summit209 and the outline for a new Partnership Strategy210 are obviously de termined 
by the circumstances, focusing on climate change, natural disasters and in par-
ticular Haiti. Migration does not appear in the identified priorities. Only time 
will tell whether a balanced and comprehensive approach can be reached.
Although the importance of a broad political dialogue is also included in the 
relation with the Pacific region,211 no specific mention is made on migration. This 
is not that surprising considering the geographical distance and the importance of 
other common interests.
The lacunae in Article 13 Cotonou, too much attention for illegal migration 
and a lack of implementation of general evolutions, such as attention for mobility 
and migration as a contribution for development, called for a revision and opera-
tionalization of the Article.212 The negotiating directives213 seemed promising in 
bringing it in line with the Global Approach, however caution towards overstress-
ing illegal migration was advised. The problems surrounding migration issues 
are illustrated by the fact that the main text of the revised version does not con-
tain these new elements on migration.214 The criticism215 for too much attention 
on illegal mi gration, without any guarantee that the ACP countries may fulfil 
in the bi-regional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclu-
sion”, 18 May 2010, 9931/10 (Presse 131).
208) EU-Lac Summit, Madrid Action Plan (2010–2012) “Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partner-
ship: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion”, 18 May 2010.
209) IV EU-CARIFORUM Summit Joint Communiqué, 17 May 2010, 9831/10 (Presse 128).
210) Outline for a Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy, 17 May 2010, 9701/10 (Presse 118).
211) Communication form the Commission tot the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, “EU relations with the Pacific Islands. A strategy for a strengthened 
partnership”, 29.05.2006, COM(2006)248.
212) E. Koeb and H. Hohmeister, “The revision of Article 13 on Migration of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement. What’s at stake for the ACP?”, ECDPM, December 2009.
213) Council of the European Union N° 6383/09, ACP 45 PTOM 13, Brussels, 13 February 2009.
214) Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – Agreed consolidated text 11 March 2010 (http://ec.
europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf ), 
signed on 19 March 2010. Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement signed, Ouagadougou, 22 June 
2010, 11329/10 (Presse 187). OJ L 297/3 of 04.11.2010.
215) Koeb and Hohmeister, supra note 212; http://migreurop.org/Article1627.html?lang=en.
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their obligations and are able to guarantee the respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms, as is nec es sary under a readmission commitment, remain relevant con-
sidering the suggestions made on the part of the EU.216 Besides, the suggested 
inclusion of the principle of circular migration as such was not welcomed, as 
bilateral measures indicate that these are instruments in the interest of the Mem-
ber States to tackle illegal migration and stressed on the return treating the migrant 
worker as disposables. The EU and the ACP only agreed in a joint declaration to 
continue and strengthen the dialogue and cooperation on migration and report 
on the progress made to the next ACP-EU Council (June 2011).217 The identifi-
cation of the remaining points of disagreement, in particular the readmission 
clause and the need to assure that Official Development Assistance is not made 
dependent on the signing of readmission agreements, demon strates the concerns 
for the instruments to be used for conducting “restrictive and security-driven 
immigration policies”.218 It is hoped that the foreseen commitment to strengthen 
cooperation in the area of migration and negotiations for an appendix219 to the 
convention will answer the quest for a comprehensive approach encompassing a 
true ‘Migration and Development’ cooperation, concrete opportunities for 
increased mobility also for low skilled, strong and binding provisions also on legal 
migration, mitigating brain drain and making migration a truly free choice.220
4.2. Trade in Services at the Service of Development?
Although the EPA provisions on trade in services provide for a temporary right to 
perform a given economic activity and make movement across borders easier, it 
does not cover visa or conditions on entry, stay and work.221 Nonetheless, it has a 
great impact on whether or not these legal commitments are coherent with the 
contribution of legal migration to development and at the same time mitigate 
brain drain, thus turning trade into a highly sensitive political migration issue. 
216) Suggested changes on the part of the EU even make the commitments on the part of the ACP more 
arduous, e.g. making the readmission clause self-executing and increasing the burden of proof and time 
in establishing the country of origin. 
217) The joint declaration (II) on migration and development calls for a comprehensive and balanced 
approach, based on three pillars: Migration and Development, including brain drain and remittances; 
legal migration, including mobility movement of skills and services and illegal migration. The Parties will 
work out the details of the enhanced cooperation on migration and commit to a timely completion of the 
dialogue. (OJ L 287/48 of 04.11.2010)
218) Concord Cotonou Wokring Group, briefing Paper, “The revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agree-
ment”, ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly, 19the Session, Tenerife, 27 March–1 April 2010.
219) Background note on the Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, Brussels, 19 March 2010.
220) Concord Cotonou Working Group, briefing Paper, “The revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agree-
ment”, February 2010.
221) Service providers were generally not considered as immigrants. On the gradual weakening of the 
services and migration distinction, see: V. HATZOPOULOS, “Liberalizing Trade in Services: Creating new 
Migrant Opportunities”, Research Papers in Law (Cahiers juridiques), No 1/010 (www.coleurope.eu), 29.
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The provisions on services with a possible impact on these issues are those that 
produce a certain movement of persons, being mode 3 GATS (commercial pres-
ence) or establishment and in particular mode 4 GATS (temporary presence of 
natural persons), the one often implying also the other. It is analyzed if the feasi-
ble solution that mode 4 GATS might offer for development, as suggested in 
particular by developing countries,222 is implemented in the EPA in the best opti-
mal way.223
In Lomé IV (Article 185), the importance of the service sector and the goal 
of gradual liberalization was recognized, but the matter was left to future coop-
eration and negotiations. The commitment in the Cotonou Convention towards 
the WTO regarding trade in goods was not so firm for trade in services and 
only anticipated on the future extension of the EPAs to encompass liberalization 
of services (Article 41, paragraph 4).224 The majority of the EPAs are only step-
ping stone agreements concluded with one or more countries and including 
only trade in goods. The one with Cameroon225 only refers to commitments under 
the GATS, the Cotonou Framework and a deadline already passed, for extending 
the scope and liberalization of establishment and trade in services (Article 54 
and 55). This is also the case in the one with the SADC EPA States (Article 13 
iuncto 67).226 The Ivory Coast EPA227 (Article 44) was even more general in refer-
ring to Cotonou, the WTO and trade in services, without reference to the GATS, 
liberalization and a deadline. The difficult balance in trade in services at the service 
of development also came to the fore in the drafting of the Pacific EPA, including 
provisions on skilled and semi-skilled, but with no reference to low skilled ser-
vice workers. Eventually, the draft was not accepted and the commitments in 
222) X., “Negotiating Services Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) With the European Union: Some Issues for 
Developing Countries to Consider”, South Centre (www.southcentre.org), Geneva, June 2009, 7–8. If 
mode 4, through binding commitments in agreements, is used in a way that would benefit both coun-
tries, it would be a major improvement compared to the mobility partnerships which are voluntary. 
Hoekman and Özden, supra note 126, pp. (835) 852 (857).
223) In addition, account needs to be taken of the fact that mode 4 GATS is also subject to the nego tiations 
in the Doha Round (“Understanding GATS Mode 4: Return Migration of Temporary Workers”, Briefing 
Paper, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, August 2007–October 2007, Volume 26 Number 4).
224) This was not altered under the second revision of the Convention.
225) Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the on part, and the Central African Party, of the other Part, OJ L 57/1 
of 28 February 2009. The EPA endorses the 7th Partnership by implementing the employment growth as 
a general objective (Article 2 (h)).
226) Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States (Botswana, Lesotho, Swazi-
land, Namibia), of the other part, OJ L 319/3 of 4 December 2009. The preamble only includes the wish 
to create new opportunities for employment.
227) Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Côte d’Ivoire, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 59/1 of 3 March 2009.
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Article 69, paragraph 1 of the interim agreement228 only refer to ongoing nego-
tiations for a comprehensive EPA.229
A comprehensive and global EPA was only concluded with the CARIFORUM 
states.230 It is clear from the outset, the provisions on commercial presence (Arti-
cles 65–74) and on temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes 
(Articles 80–84) and from the list with specific commitments (Annex IV) that 
these are only aimed at (highly) skilled service providers.231 Article 60 (5) explic-
itly excludes natural persons seeking access to the employment market. The list 
with commitments on commercial presence of business services includes for 
example medical and den tal services, midwives, nurses etc. The provisions on 
temporary presence illustrate this even more clearly, being limited to key person-
nel, graduated trainees, business services sellers, short term visitors for business 
purposes, independent professionals and contractual service suppliers. The latter 
two are constraint through a limited enumeration of categories (Article 83) and 
the majority requiring a university degree or professional qualifications. It is not 
overtly clear whether these categories also fall under the abovementioned (supra, 
section 3.1.) visa waiver agreements. In principle, it excludes persons who travel 
for the purpose of a paid activity from the waiver exemption, but the joint decla-
ration clarifies these persons should 232 not cover e.g., business persons and intra-
corporate trainees. This would seem logic, leading to an actual facilitation of 
mobility.
These provisions illustrate the position taken by the developed countries reject-
ing the use of mode 4 GATS as an option also for lower and unskilled migrants, 
as long as developing countries can not sufficiently guarantee their return.233
The access of those service providers is not without reservations and is, since it 
regards services, temporary anyhow. Article 60, paragraph 5 furthermore states 
the provisions are not applicable for measures regarding citizenship, residence and 
employment on a permanent basis.234 The provisions on the presence of natural 
228) Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific 
States (Papua New Guinea and the Fiji Islands), of the other part, OJ L 272/2 of 16 October 2009.
229) J. Kelsey, “Going Nowhere in a Hurry? The Pacific’s EPA Negotiations with the European Union”, 
VUWLawRW 8, 2007 (38,1); Van Criekinge, supra note 179, p. (173) 186.
230) Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the Euro-
pean Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 289/I/1 of 30 October 2008.
231) Although it must be mentioned the commitments on the part of the EU are considered to be more 
liberal than the commitments under the GATS.
232) The Dutch and German translation are formulated more in a “do not cover” way.
233) X., “Negotiating Services Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) With the European Union: Some Issues 
for Developing Countries to Consider”, South Centre (www.southcentre.org), Geneva, June 2009, 7–8; 
Van Criekinge, supra note 179, p. (173) 179.
234) This in conformity with the Annex to the GATS on the Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services under the Agreement, where the application is explicitly excluded for natural persons seeking 
access to the employment market of a Member and for measures regarding citizenship, residence and 
employment on a permanent basis.
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per sons contain limited timeframes, e.g. one year for graduate trainees (Article 81). 
Al though being temporary in nature the third country national might, e.g. after 
his con tracts with his employer in an ACP country ends, seek to apply the Blue 
Card directive and consequently, if in conformity with the criteria, the status is 
granted235 satisfy the conditions for a long term resident status more easily. 
Although the Blue Card directive does not apply to persons who enter under 
commitments in an international agreement facilitating entry and temporary stay 
of trade or investment-related natural persons (Article 3 (g)), there seems to be no 
obstacle for applying the directive after the entry based on such a provision. There 
appears to be, besides the made reservations of some Member States and possible 
e.g. qualification require ments, no hindrance (connected to development consid-
erations) for a service pro vider from an ACP country to establish a practice here. 
It must however be noticed that for medical services, midwives, nurses etc., the 
possibilities to provide services are (seriously) constrained through national reser-
vations and Member States who are unbound (meaning no commitment is made 
to liberalize).236 The reservations are especially present under mode 4237 and are 
clearly not motivated by pure altruism, but are mainly based on the economic 
needs test, recognition, nationality or resi dence requirements238 as remaining bar-
riers to trade.239 Nonetheless, these aspects of the service provisions might aggra-
vate the brain drain problem since there are no guarantees to ensure temporariness 
or circularity.240 As already clarified, the Blue Card directive contains weak com-
mitments, nor does the EPA provide for guarantees to mitigate brain drain, 
although binding commitments could have easily been included, being a mixed 
agreement. This might have provided a dignified alternative for the absence of 
a Union Code of Conduct. The contribution to development and in particular 
the mitigation of the negative consequences, will have to be supported through 
other measures, such as the initiatives on the cooperation of diasporas or bilateral 
agreements/measures by individual Member States. Nevertheless, these often 
offer little legal certainty.
The facilitation to provide services might be an added value for the country of 
origin on other fronts, but it seems to be mainly directed to the (highly) skilled, 
235) For example, a requirement might be she/he is at least legally present in a Member State (see Article 
10 Directive 2009/50/EC).
236) Hoekman and Özden, supra note 126, pp. (835) 852 (857), indicates that 16 Member States will 
apply an economic needs test in case of medical and dental service, 21 Member States did for veterinary 
services and 22 apply a test regarding nursing services. 
237) P. Sauvé and N. Ward, Services and investment in the EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agree-
ment: Innovation in rule-design and implications for Africa.
238) Pending an agreement on mutual recognition the requirements of the territory where the service is 
supplied apply (Article 85) (and as also provided for in Article VII GATS). The second review of Cotonou 
Convention should also accelerate work on the mutual recognition of higher education qualification 
(Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement signed, Ouagadougou, 22 June 2010, 11329/10 (Presse 187).
239) The treatment of professional services in the EPA, www.crnm.org. 
240) Van Criekinge, supra note 179, p. (173) 188.
 P. Devisscher / European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 53–94 93
increasing the brain drain problem and with the EPA containing little flanking 
measures241 guaranteeing a development contribution to the country of origin. 
Once more the EPA appears to address the desire of the Union and the Member 
States in attracting highly skilled, but not doing much for the requests of the 
developing countries for more options regarding lower or unskilled and to ease 
the minds on the loss of their highly skilled in vulnerable sectors, which could 
perfectly have been included in the Union/Member State and third country 
agreement.
5. Conclusions
The main aim, as elaborated in the PCD, of making migration work for develop-
ment, reconciling Europe’s desires regarding migration with the development 
needs of third countries, has mainly worked in the minds of policy makers. Over 
the years, progress has been made to a more balanced and comprehensive migra-
tion policy, but the discourse lingers too much on policy pledges. General policy 
statements as well as specific legal commitments are showing major lacunas in 
responding to these demands. Too much emphasis has been put on the security 
dimension, the interests of the Union and in particular, its Member States. The 
latter holding on tight to their legal migration competence and showing a lack of 
political will, resulting not only in a lack of a common approach to migration, 
but also making the demands of the developing countries too much dependent 
on their goodwill. These obstacles have left tremendous gaps in a legally coherent 
migration-development policy guaranteeing the attainment of the MDG.
Where measures have been taken, they are not legally binding and where they 
are, commitments on the part of the Union are weak, while in parallel imposing 
strict obligations on the third country. Measures are mainly in the interest of 
the Union/ Member States and lack an even balance with the needs of the devel-
oping country. It is wondered if the change in decision-making to co-decision 
and qualified majority voting, under Art. 79 TFEU, and to alteration of the 
CCP to an exclusive competence (Art. 207 TFEU) might offer more leeway for a 
development friendly evolution in the migration and trade policy. However, 
recent initiatives, such as the Stockholm programme, the Return Directive,242 the 
apparent evolution of making aid condi tional upon cooperation in illegal migra-
tion matters and the debate surrounding Article 13 Cotonou, do not seem to 
241) E.g. the chapter on social aspects contributes to the employment facet of the 7th Partnership with 
provisions on employment, social policy and decent work.
242) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European parliament and the Council if 16 December 2008 on com-
mon standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals, 
OJ L 348/98 of 24 December 2008.
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bring a turnabout in this evolution and are in con tradiction to the goal of making 
migration work for development.
It is not suggested that one measure is better than the other, it is however 
asserted that there is an urgent need for more coherence243 between trade, migra-
tion and development and for a common approach balancing the interest of both 
parties, and putting the legal possibilities to their most optimal use.
243) In conformity with Articles 13(1) and 21(3) VEU and Articles 7 TFEU and 208 TFEU.
